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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Applications of auction design 
Nowadays, mechanism design and especially auction formats receive increasing 
scientific and public awareness because of its importance in the organization of 
many economic and social processes, such as the distribution of energy 
resources, the allocation of public infrastructure projects, the selling of bandwidth 
in telecommunications or even the design of voting schemes. This attention arises 
as mechanism design modifies the perspective on certain problems of economic 
theory. In fact, the main idea of mechanism design is to propose settings that 
facilitate the achievement of overall social goals even though rational individuals 
act according to their own personal interests. Thereby mechanism design follows 
the concept of competitive situations instead of central regulation to enhance the 
efficiency of allocation processes. In short, the aim is to find the right synthesis 
between individual and higher, common benefits. As a consequence, the variable 
of the concrete economic problem changes from finding optimal strategies for 
single agents towards the problem of defining an appropriate allocation process 
that ensures a set of desirable characteristics considering the totality of the 
participants’ desires. 
 
Even though mechanism design is a relatively new research field, first auctions go 
back to antiquity when auction formats were used in addition to other early trading 
formats as barter and haggling. It is known that in several ancient cultures of the 
Western hemisphere, such as those of the Babylonians, Greeks and Romans, 
auctions were held to trade land, food or slaves or to reallocate the spoils of war 
between the winning soldiers. Similarly to modern times, auctions were also used 
to sell valuable objects of household, namely works of art and pieces of furniture. 
Undoubtedly the most remarkable auction of the antiquity was the sale of the 
whole Roman Empire by the Praetorian Guard in 193 A.D. after overthrowing the 
former Emperor Pertinax (ref. Krishna, 2010, p. 2). Didius Julianus offered the 
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highest bid by promising 25,000 sesterces to each of the Praetorian Guard, 
wherewith he owned the right to become the next Emperor of the Roman Empire.  
 
Nevertheless, auctions in antiquity were used more seldom and relatively sporadic 
in comparison to other trading formats. After the collapse of the Roman Empire 
and the involved political realignment of the Western hemisphere, auctions lost 
economic relevance until the beginning of the modern era. It took until the 17th 
century for auctions to regain popularity in Europe for the allocation of scarce 
goods like wine, art and jewelry. Admittedly the most significant upturn of auctions 
was due to the English and Dutch applications and further developments of 
auction formats, wherefore the most popular auction designs are named English 
auction and Dutch auction. 
The English auction is the oldest and most common auction format. In the original 
formulation of the English auction the auctioneer starts the auction with an initial 
price for the good that is seen as acceptable for many buyers. Afterwards, the 
auctioneer requests the buyers to overbid the initial price. If one buyer raises the 
offer, her bid is set the current highest bid and the auctioneer continues the 
auction by asking for higher bids. This procedure is done until no buyer is willing to 
offer a higher bid and consequently the auctioneer allocates the good to the buyer 
with the current highest proposal. Finally, the winning buyer has to pay a trading 
price that equals her highest bid. As the price is increased monotonically by each 
step, the English auction is also called open ascending-price auction. Additionally 
it is presumed that the name “auction”, deviated from the Latin word augere, which 
means to increase (ref. Krishna, 2010, p. 2), is due to the ascending-price or 
English auction. 
In contrast to the English auction, the Dutch auction is defined by a decreasing 
series of trading prices. Starting with an initial price that is seen as too high to be 
acceptable, the auctioneer lowers the price monotonically by each step of the 
auction. Finally the good is allocated to the buyer who first signaled to buy the 
good for the trading price currently proposed by the auctioneer. Due to the fact 
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that the trading price is decreased by each step of the auction, the Dutch auction 
is also known as open decreasing-price auction. 
 
Nowadays, auctions are widely used in the private sector to trade goods of almost 
all kinds and their formulations are carefully adapted to the specific economic 
environments1. During the last decade, options to purchase, trade or even to sell 
goods by an auction rapidly grew. For instance, the opportunities internet-based 
auction designs offer enable a continuous growth of potential buyers and sellers2. 
Beside the private sector, the public sector is also becoming increasingly aware of 
the possibilities auctions offer for selling public goods such as spectrum rights, 
mining rights and infrastructure projects, or even to trade CO2 abatements. 
Additionally, governmental institutions facilitate the installation of auctions in 
private sectors e.g. for the selling of electricity and of natural gas3. 
 
Considering the multitude of different applications of auctions designs in economic 
life, the question inevitably arises, which advantages auctions offer in comparison 
to other market-based concepts like e.g. trade-off, bargaining and fixed-price 
selling. The main advantage of auctions is its adaptability to the requirements of 
the economic problem. An auction is defined as a “competition among the buyers 
according to rules set out by the seller” (ref, Krishna, 2010, p. 61). Obviously, the 
concrete formulation of the set of allocation rules can vary according to actual 
conditions of the economic environments and additional goals the auctioneer 
focuses on.  
                                               
1 The economic environment describes the exogenous parameters, such as individual values, 
technology and ex-ante resource endowment, which have to be treated as given in allocation 
problems (ref. Hurwicz, 1972, p.297). 
2 In the last decade e-commerce boomed due to the potentials internet-based auctions offer. The 
revenue of internet-based auctions such as ebay and Amazon grew by about 500% during the 
decade (ref. Bailey, 2013). 
3 Following the strategy of the European Comission on renewable energies auction formats are 
going to get a higher importance for future energy trades in the European Union. 
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As a consequence, auctions are distinguished, for instance, in the way individual 
information is collected and for which kind of economic environments they are 
constructed. First, auction formats differ in the way the individual information is 
sent to the auctioneer. Consequently, it is distinguished between auctions where 
agents are asked to send sealed bids, in contrast to those where agents are asked 
to send open bids to the auctioneer. Furthermore, auction formats differ in the 
formulation of the pricing rule (e.g. first-price auctions and second-price auctions 
exist, and the processing, e.g. static auctions or dynamic auctions). Finally, the 
economic environment has an influence on the formulation of an auction, 
wherefore auctions are distinguished according to the characteristics of the goods 
to be traded (e.g. single-unit auctions and multi-unit auctions, and the nature of the 
values of the agents, e.g. private-value auctions and interdependent-value 
auctions).  
 
In the following dissertation three concrete economic environments are analyzed 
and suitable auction formats are presented to adequately distribute scarce goods4. 
The concepts the proposed auctions are based on belong to mechanism design 
and are briefly introduced in sections 1.2 to 1.4. These sections give only a short 
introduction into the general concepts of mechanism design and particularly into 
market-based designs like auctions.  For a more detailed discourse about 
mechanism design refer e.g. to Osborne; Rubinstein, 1994 or Kreps, 1990. For 
comprehensive information about auction design refer e.g. to Krishna, 2010 or 
Milgrom, 2004. 
 
  
                                               
4 Subsequently, it is formulated which characteristics of an allocation process this paper focus on. 
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1.2. Optimal use of information in allocation processes 
Inseparably compounded with the concepts of mechanism design is the discussion 
about the correct usage of knowledge in allocation processes. In other fields of 
economic theory information is treated as completely given to a principal or even 
to the agents, or at least quantifiable by probability calculations. Assuming that 
complete information exists and is known to the auctioneer at any time during the 
allocation process, the problem is well defined and solvable with existing 
mathematical methods. Difficulties in auction design, for instance, arise as 
information concerning all relevant facts concerning to the allocation of a certain 
resource is spread over all market participants (ref. Hayek, 1945, p. 1). Even a 
central authority, possibly the principal that coordinates the allocation process, 
does not inevitably have complete information of all relevant aspects concerning 
the allocation process. Consequently, Hayek notes that the problem of allocating 
resources cannot be separated from the problem of an effective and efficient 
usage of the individual information. 
Considering the discussion about the correct use of individual knowledge, the 
main task is to define a market that optimally makes use of the existing 
information, regardless of whether the information is public or private. As a 
consequence, the question arises whether the planning process should be 
centralized by providing the principal with the complete information or if decisions 
should be made in a decentralized manner (ref. Hayek, 1945, p. 2). Even the 
concept of collecting knowledge from experts in order to provide the principal with 
suitable information is limited, as additional individual information exists that can 
only be used appropriately by working together with each agent. Instead of a 
centralized planning, perfect competition5 maintains the efficient usage of 
knowledge even more. In fact, markets with complete competition are 
                                               
5 Perfect or respectively complete competition is described in Hayek, 1949, p. 95 as a market in 
which the following conditions concerning the absence of market power, a free market entry and 
complete information are satisfied: 
“1. A homogeneous commodity offered and demanded by a large number of relatively small sellers 
or buyers, none of whom expects to exercise by his action a perceptible influence on price. 
2. Free entry into the market and absence of other restraints on the movement of prices and 
resources. 
3. Complete knowledge of the relevant factors on the part of all participants in the market”. 
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informationally more efficient than systems based on central planning (ref. 
Hurwicz, 1960, p. 340), because perfect competition motivates agents to make 
use of their individual knowledge for bidding. In comparison to regulated markets 
competitive situations encourage individuals to make use of their personal 
information in order to increase their outcome. 
Assuming that perfect competition is applied to allocate resources, it is inevitable 
that all participants can expect a non-negative outcome. Otherwise, some of the 
agents may have an incentive to leave the auction if they anticipate a negative 
gain from trade. A mechanism in which each agent expects a non-negative 
outcome is called individual rational. As individual rationality ensures the 
participation of the agents due to their own rational decisions, it is one of the 
characteristics a mechanism should satisfy. 
Another aspect is that individual revenue and the overall efficiency of a 
mechanism are conflicting aims. A natural aim of the auctioneer is to allocate the 
goods to the agents that value it most, irrespective of the economic relevance of 
reselling6. Indeed, the market participants aim to maximize their individual 
revenue, whereas the auctioneer is interested in maximizing the overall efficiency 
of the set of trades. As a consequence, the individuals knowing that the auctioneer 
focuses on the overall gains from trade may adapt their bidding strategy according 
to the rules of the mechanism in order to get higher revenue from trade. Obviously, 
bidding honestly must not necessarily be the strategy that maximizes the individual 
revenue of each agent. Considering the potentially conflicting targets of market 
participants, governmental institutions and society it is necessary to base the 
design of efficient mechanisms on a mathematical model to simulate the strategic 
behavior of rational individuals.  
 
                                               
6 Following the Coase theorem in markets without transaction costs and with perfect information, 
inefficiency could be solved by resale after the original trade (ref. Caose, 1960). A recent scientific 
discourse created several concepts that increase the efficiency of a previous auction by installing a 
second auction to resell the goods afterwards (ref. Krishna, 2010, pp. 54-60). 
Nevertheless, allocative efficiency remains an important property of auctions as transaction cost, 
time requirements or market entrance barriers cannot be neglected without further consideration. 
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1.3. Modeling non-cooperative situations 
At the same time as Hayek posed his thesis about the correct usage of personal 
information, von Neumann and Morgenstern founded the fundamentals of the 
modern-day game theory by publishing their book “Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior”. Even if in the 18th and 19h century some isolated game 
theoretic problems were discussed, it took until the middle of the 20th century to 
develop a theoretic model to address non-cooperative situations in general. In 
1944 von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the basic principles for the 
mathematical formulation of economic problems with rational individuals acting 
according to their personal interests faced with cooperative and competitive 
economic situations. Beside a general introduction into the modeling and solution 
concepts of game theory, the authors also provide the answer for finding economic 
equilibriums7 in zero-sum games, a class of games in which the earnings equal the 
losses (ref. von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). A few years later Nash extended 
the existing concepts of game theory to non-cooperative games in general (ref. 
Nash, 1950)8. Therefore, Nash introduced the concept of repeated gaming and 
showed that there exists at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies for every finite 
n-person game9. 
 
The importance of modern game theory is due to the fact that the concepts are 
applicable to non-cooperative situations in many research fields of economics, 
physics, biology, social science and computer science. Even if the original scope 
of application was the modeling of economic behavior, the concepts of game 
theory were transferred to design competitive situations of any rational individual. 
Consequently, game theoretical models were used to model problems of 
population biology, intra-species and extra-species competition and evolutionary 
                                               
7 A set of strategies is called an economic equilibrium if no agent could gain from switching to 
another strategy while the other agents adhere to their strategies. 
8 In 1994, the Royal Swedish Academy of Science awarded the Nobel Prize in economics to Nash, 
recognizing the meaning of his paper “Non-cooperative Games” for economic theory. 
9 In contrast to pure strategies where agents repeatedly use the same plan in every game, mixed 
strategies describes a gaming strategy where agents switch their plan randomly according to an 
ex-ante defined probability distribution. 
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theory. An important aspect of game theory is that it provides the term equilibrium 
as a solution to competitive situations with rational individuals. Thereby game 
theory also facilitates a different perspective on philosophical problems,  such as 
the social dilemmas of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
 
Beside the development of a wide range of applications for game theory, 
beginning from the mid 1960th research focused on refining the concept of a Nash 
equilibrium and developing numerical and analytical methods to solve games. 
Terms like weak dominance10, subgame perfection11 and sequential equilibrium 
were developed in order to complete the solution concepts of modern game 
theory. Nowadays, several numerical solution concepts exist that compute at least 
one equilibrium of a number of non-cooperative games. These are the backward 
induction for games in extensive form and fictive playing, solving of the 
corresponding dual problem by linear programming and graphical methods to 
solve strategic form games. In addition, there exist several specialized solution 
techniques that take advantage of the specific form of the game. 
 
The scientific discourse about an adequate design of mechanisms for economic 
and social problems is based on the formalisms game theory provides. 
Furthermore, it follows that there exists at least one equilibrium for any n-person 
game, a proposition that is adaptable to auctions. Taking into consideration that 
there exist plenty of numerical and analytical methods to compute solutions of 
competitive games, it can be assumed that rational individuals know their optimal 
response strategy to every possible bidding strategy her opponents use. 
 
                                               
10 A weakly dominant strategy guarantees the agent an outcome that is at least as high as that of 
all other possible strategies despite of the other agents’ behavior. In contrast a strictly dominant 
strategy results in a strictly better outcome for the agent compared the all possible strategies. 
11 If a strategy set that represents a Nash equilibrium in the original game is also a Nash 
equilibrium of any subgame of the original game, than it is called a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
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1.4. Motivation for the dissertation 
An important question of mechanism design was if it is possible to focuse on the 
creation of direct-revelation mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms in which the agents 
directly submit their information to the auctioneer without using an intermediary. 
The revelation principle developed in several steps by Gibbard, 1973, Green and 
Laffont, 1977 and Myerson, 1979 indicates that research on incentive compatible 
mechanisms can be restricted to direct-revelation mechanisms. In fact, for each 
mechanism that implements a social choice function in dominant strategies there 
exists an incentive, direct-revelation mechanism that generates the same outcome 
(ref. Gibbard, 1973, Green & Laffont, 1977 and Myerson, 1979). As a 
consequence, the scientific research on incentive compatible mechanisms can 
concentrate on direct mechanisms, as for each mechanism there exists at least 
one pay-off equivalent direct mechanism. 
 
Considering the basic characteristic a mechanism ha to provide, the requirement 
of a free market entry, it is important to ensure that the rational individuals join an 
auction due to their own interest. Consequently, individual rationality is important 
for the design of a competitive market as an auction design. Another aspect that 
has to be considered is the fact that knowledge is generally not public. As a 
consequence, the risk arises that some of the agents try to increase their gains 
from trade and do not follow the postulated strategies (ref. Samuelson, 1954, p. 
389). For mechanisms that are not created appropriately, strategies may exist that 
allow agents to increase their personal gains from trade by acting dishonestly at 
the expense of the other participants. Consequently, the aim of achieving an 
incentive compatible mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that does not offer incentives 
to signal false values, is regarded as essential to install a fair and transparent 
allocation process. 
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Beside incentive compatibility and individual rationality, the concept of fulfilling a 
certain social choice function is central in mechanism design.  The concept is to 
optimize a social choice function while still ensuring incentive compatibility and 
individual rationality. An important aspect is that the specific form of the social 
choice function could be adapted according to the preferences of the mechanism 
designer12. Although other concepts exist, the achievement of allocative efficiency, 
i.e. the maximization of the total gain from trade, is the most common social choice 
function. The concept of allocative efficiency follows the idea of allocating scarce 
goods to the agents that value them most. Obviously, the maximization of the sum 
of trading benefits is rival to the goal of rational individuals that prioritize 
maximizing their personal gain from trade. 
Inevitably the question arises whether there exist limitations concerning the 
economic environment or even impossibilities in achieving all the relevant 
characteristics of mechanism design – incentive compatibility, individual rationality 
and allocative efficiency – at the same time. It is known that for agents with quasi-
linear private utilities the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-mechanisms13 are allocative 
efficient and that bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy (ref. Maskin, 1992, p. 
121). Thus, if agents can be assumed to have purely private values, there exists a 
class of mechanisms that achieve strong characteristics. 
 
Considering the strong characteristics of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-mechanisms 
(VCGm), what kind of problems are left for further studies on auction design? 
Subsequent, three mechanisms are introduced that focus on specific market-
based environments. An accurate study of the assumptions of the proposition 
concerning the unique properties of the VCGm reveals that they are efficient for 
economic environments in which buyers have purely private values. Considering 
                                               
12 For instance there exist different concepts for markets that maximize the outcome of sellers or 
the outcome of buyers or even that of the auctioneer. 
13 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-mechanisms describe a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that 
base on the second-price auction proposed in 1961 by Vickrey (ref. Vickrey, 1961, p. 8). Clarke 
(ref. Clarke, 1971) and Groves (ref. Groves, 1973) generalized the concept of the second-price 
auction presented by Vickrey to the multi-unit environment. 
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two-sided auctions, the VCGm generally fail to balance the sum the buyers spend 
with the sum the sellers receive, i.e. the VCGm are not budget balanced for double 
auctions.  Furthermore, it is known that efficient and budget balanced allocations 
are generally not incentive compatible (ref. Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983). 
Therefore, the problem of finding mechanisms that balance the conflicting aims of 
incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency in complex economic environments 
is central in this thesis. The scientific discourse of the recent years provides 
several double auctions that are allocative efficient, but only ensure approximate 
formulations of individual rationality. As a consequence, a double auction for 
private-valuation environments is introduced that broadens the existing concepts 
of market design, as it satisfies incentive compatibility, individual rationality, budget 
balance and asymptotic allocative efficiency also for the complex setting of multi-
unit markets with heterogeneous goods. Furthermore, acting honestly is a 
dominant strategy. The main aspect of the double auction presented in chapter 2 
is that individual rationality, budget balance and incentive compatibility are 
ensured without any assumption concerning the values of the agents or the size of 
the market. Allocative efficiency can be approximately achieved if the market is 
sufficiently large and the economic environment provides a homogeneous buyer-
seller structure.  
 
Second, in case the values of the agents are affiliated, the classic VCGm fail to 
achieve ex-post allocative efficiency for markets with more than two agents (ref. 
Maskin, 1992, pp. 124-125). Consequently, it seems promising to work on 
avoiding this phenomenon related to the winner’s curse14. In recent years, several 
mechanisms – mostly static auctions – were presented that achieve ex-post 
allocative efficiency. In order to overcome the problem of ex-post inefficiency, 
existing auctions for interdependent-valuation environments require lots of 
information from the agents. The core idea of the auction presented in chapter 3 is 
to limit the amount of information that has to be collected in order to define an ex-
                                               
14 The winner’s curse describes the phenomenon that the winner of a common-value auction may 
believe to overpay after reconsidering the other agents’ bids. 
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post efficient allocation. Therefore, a dynamic auction is developed that enhances 
the concept of the Ascending-Bid Auction (ref. Ausubel, 2004) by avoiding the 
stringent assumptions concerning the buyers bidding strategy. Thereby, the 
concept of the Alternating-Price Auction proposed in chapter 3 follows the 
concepts of robust mechanism design (ref. Bergemann & Morris, 2005). 
Actually, the study of an adequate dynamic auction for interdependent-valuation 
environments is limited to one-dimensional values as implementation of efficient 
allocation processes for multi-dimension values is strongly limited. Considering 
environments with multi-dimensional, interdependent values an efficient Bayesian 
implementation is not possible for almost all payoff functions (ref. Jehiel & 
Moldovanu, 1998, pp. 12-15). Furthermore, for settings with multi-dimensional, 
interdependent valuation environments it is known that only trivial choice functions 
are ex-post implementable (ref. Jehiel & Meyer-ter-Vehn & Moldovanu & Zame, 
2005, pp. 7-11). 
 
Finally, an electricity market design is presented that combines short and long-
term efficiency, which is highly relevant concerning the recent scientific discourse 
in sustainability and renewable energy. Considering that there is no double auction 
that fulfills budget balance, individual rationality, incentive compatibility and 
allocative efficiency, it follows that is complex to follow the conflicting aims of 
energy-producing companies, investors and operators of network capacities and 
finally the consumers. In addition, the chronological development has an important 
influence on the specific auction format as short-term and long-term interests have 
to be balanced out. 
 
The main task in energy markets is to reconcile the competing interests of the at 
least four participants, i.e. buyers, sellers, investors and service providers. In 
contrast to the trade of consumption goods, the trade of electricity, gas or water 
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requires a network to transport the product from seller to buyer15. Consequently, it 
is necessary to pay attention to the interests of investors and operators of the 
transport network and to balance them with those of the buyers and sellers in 
order to achieve long-term efficiency. According to recent papers, the main task is 
to find the right balance between competition and regulation to install an incentive 
compatible and allocative efficient energy trade. For this reason in chapter 4 an 
energy allocation process is proposed that uses techniques that are commonly 
used in optimal flow problems to minimize the transport costs. Due to the inclusion 
of the network costs into the allocation process, it is possible to construct a 
mechanism that satisfies short-term and long-term efficiency properties. 
  
                                               
15 In fact investments in transport capacities are expensive and use large ratio of the gross 
domestic product (ref. Newbery, 2001, p.27). If these costs shall be refinanced by the trading price 
per unit it is important to integrate the investments in transport capacities into the allocation 
process. 
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2. An Incentive Compatible Double Auction for Multi-Unit Markets with 
Heterogeneous Goods 
 
Abstract 
In the following chapter a double auction for private-valuation environments is 
presented, which, at the same time, creates an incentive compatible, individually 
rational and budget balanced allocation, while achieving asymptotic efficiency for 
large-scale markets with a homogeneous buyer-seller-structure. Thereby, the 
presented double auction is applicable in single-unit environments, multi-unit 
environments with homogeneous goods or even in multi-unit environments with 
heterogeneous goods. In fact, the proposed double auction provides an 
individually rational and incentive compatible allocation also for multi-unit markets 
with heterogeneous goods.  
In order to achieve incentive compatibility, budget balance and individual 
rationality, the proposed double auction extracts a subset of agents to calculate a 
price for each type of good and to define the bundles for the allocation. By 
excluding the extracted agents from the trade, the main properties incentive 
compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance can be ensured without 
additional assumptions concerning the agents’ valuation functions.  
Furthermore, it is shown that for large-scale markets with a homogeneous buyer-
seller-structure the loss of efficiency due to the mechanism becomes negligibly 
small compared to the overall gains from trade. 
 
2.1. Introduction into double auctions 
During the last decade, mechanism design has gained increasing attention within 
economic theory as the awareness for overall social goals grew. This process is 
not least due to worldwide financial and economic crises. Especially the rapid 
expansion of global marketplaces highlights the need for markets that facilitate the 
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creation of individual profits without deferring common interests. Indeed, 
mechanism design offers settings that encourage people to maximize their 
personal gains from trade while at the same time acting according to a common 
social goal. Therefore, especially the theories of mechanism design received 
increased attention in economic theory16.  
 
In contrast to the numerous articles that concentrate on the theory of one-sided 
auctions, the number of papers that focus on double auctions is comparatively 
small. However, globalized markets and electronic commerce offer varied 
possibilities for buying and selling goods of almost any type. As a consequence 
double auctions constructed for large markets are becoming increasingly relevant. 
Regarding the existing literature, one of the most important papers concerning 
double auctions is McAfee’s “A Dominant Strategy double auction“ (McAfee, 
1992). The presented double auction for single-unit environments is individually 
rational and approximately allocative efficient. In order to generate the trading 
price and to clear the market, McAfee extracts the least efficient pair of traders. 
Assuming that the agents’ utilities are bounded, the inefficiency is limited and for 
large markets this loss of efficiency becomes insignificantly small compared to the 
total gains from trade. Furthermore, acting honestly is a weakly dominant strategy, 
i.e. bidding according to the individual values is an optimal strategy regardless of 
other agents’ actions. 
In fact, the properties a mechanism with two or more agents could simultaneously 
provide are restricted. Considering the impossibility theorem of Hurwicz, there 
exists no incentive compatible mechanism that realizes an efficient and individually 
rational outcome in dominant strategies (ref. Hurwicz, 1972). As a consequence, 
                                               
16 In 2007 the Royal Swedish Academy of Science awarded the Nobel prize in economics to 
Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson for their studies on mechanism design and their immense impact in 
economic theory (ref. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel 2007, pp. 1). 
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the implementation in dominant strategies is often given up in favor of deriving an 
allocative efficient and individually rational allocation. 
Furthermore, Myerson and Satterthwaite demonstrated that efficient and budget 
balanced allocations are generally not incentive compatible (Myerson and 
Satterthwaite, 1983). Taking into account that it is impossible to provide a 
mechanism that guarantees the properties budget balance, incentive compatibility, 
individual rationality and allocative efficiency at the same time, it is convenient to 
weaken at least one of these properties in order to enforce the others. In most 
cases, authors decide to soften the aim of achieving allocative efficiency and 
budget balance and concentrate on achieving the remaining properties individual 
rationality and incentive compatibility17. 
If, for instance, one considers the papers of Satterthwaite and Williams 
(Satterthwaite and Williams, 1989) and (Gresik and Satterthwaite, 1989), the 
likelihood of gaining from underreporting vanishes at a rate of        as the 
market grows18. Satterthwaite and Williams showed that it is getting progressively 
more complex to find a strategy that creates a higher outcome than that of 
revealing the truth if the number of agents increases. This property is used for 
different concepts to limit the incentive incompatibilities of an auction. One 
extension of McAfee’s approach that uses this property was presented in “A 
Strategy-Proof Multiunit Double Auction Mechanism” (Huang, Scheller-Wolf and 
Sycara, 2002). This double auction is designed for multi-unit environments with 
homogeneous goods, and ensures incentive compatibility with respect to the price 
definition. In addition, this multi-unit double auction is individually rational, weakly 
budget balanced and approximately allocative efficient. Nevertheless, especially 
for small markets double auctions such as that from Huang, Scheller-Wolf and 
Sycara provide incentives for agents to misrepresent their true values in order to 
be part of the allocation and to increase their gain from trade. 
                                               
17 In contrast to weaker formulations of allocative efficiency or budget balance approximate 
definitions of individual rationality are more viable. The concept of decreasing incentives to 
misrepresent the own values if the size of the market grows is studied in Satterthwaite and 
Williams, 1989. 
18 The integer   defines the number of agents that participate in the auction. 
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Consequently, an important goal of this paper is to derive a double auction that 
prevents agents from misrepresenting their true values. Thus, the fact that the 
scale of future markets is likely to increase offers options to raise the efficiency of 
the auction while ensuring the other important properties budget balance, 
individual rationality and incentive compatibility. 
Another interesting approach to circumvent the impossibility theorem of Williams 
and Satterthwaite was developed by Bartal, Gonen and La Mura (ref. Bartal, 
Gonen & La Mura, 2004). Their idea to facilitate budget balance, individual 
rationality, incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency for the single-unit 
market is to compute pairs of agents which are given a price range instead of a 
definite price for one trade of a single good. As the final definition of the price is 
subject to negotiations after the auction, the guarantee of efficiency or, 
respectively, incentive compatibility depends on the concrete form of the 
negotiation algorithm. Even the enlargement of the price range mechanism to 
markets with multiple and heterogeneous goods is unanswered. 
 
In conclusion, this paper focuses on developing a double auction that is incentive 
compatible, budget balanced and individually rational for the complex setting of a 
multi-unit market with heterogeneous goods. In addition, the mechanism is 
carefully constructed to limit the loss of efficiency, i.e. to achieve a weaker 
formulation of allocative efficiency called asymptotical allocative efficiency. The 
main idea of the double auction is to extract a sample of buyers and sellers in 
order to use their individual information for the creation of the trading price and the 
allocation of bundles. Thereby incentive compatibility is ensured due to the 
structure of the mechanism without further assumptions concerning the valuation 
function of the agents. For simplicity, the double auction from this chapter is 
henceforth called Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA). 
Following this, the different questions that arise considering the extraction of a 
group of agents are discussed. How many buyers and sellers should be removed 
to fix the price? Which are the criteria that define the buyers and sellers that are 
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taken from the original set of agents? Which rule determines the price and how to 
decide which goods each agent is allowed to trade? All aspects are approached in 
consideration of the improvement of the properties of the ICDA. 
Accordingly, the paper starts in the following section 2.2 with the definition of multi-
unit markets with heterogeneous goods and the mathematical definition of  the 
properties budget balance, individual rationality, incentive compatibility and 
allocative efficiency. Afterwards, in section 2.3, the structure of the ICDA is 
introduced. In section 2.4 and section 2.5 the different components of the ICDA 
are derived. Finally, in the last two sections the properties of the ICDA and the 
characteristics of this approach are discussed in detail. 
 
2.2. Setting of a multi-unit market with heterogeneous goods 
Before putting the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) into concrete 
terms, it is necessary to formulate some basic definitions of markets with     
heterogeneous goods. These formulations are needed to discuss the intended 
properties of the mechanism in detail. 
At the beginning, each seller      owns   
   
   units of good        , i.e. her 
personal portfolio is defined as the set 
        
   
     
   
            
The set of all available goods is defined as 
                 
 
As the economic environment of markets with heterogeneous goods allows each 
seller to sell goods of different types at the same time, it is necessary to consider 
bundles of goods. Instead of a separate analysis of demand and supply of each 
good, the valuation has to be carried out by comparing complete packages 
consisting of goods of different types.  
(2.2) 
(2.1) 
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These bundles consist of   quantities – one for each type of good. Consequently, 
the real-valued vector function 
                  
defines the private valuation function of seller      that assigns an individual 
value to each bundle        .
19 The second group of agents that participate in 
the auction consists of the buyers           which demand bundles of the   
goods from the sellers. Similarly to the formulation from above the private 
valuation function of buyer      is expressed by 
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In addition to the individual valuation function, the agents’ utilities of a concrete 
bundle     also depend on the market price      . The k-th component of the 
price vector       corresponds to the price of good        . As quasi-linearity 
is assumed for all agents the utility function of each buyer      can be described 
by 
                               
and that of  each seller      can be defined by 
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Furthermore it is assumed that the participation in the double auction does not 
create additional effort for the agents.  
                                               
19 The definition of the bundles         as a real valued vector allows also to trade shares of 
goods. 
20 In this paper the agents’ valuation functions are not restricted to be linear. As a reason the value 
of a bundle does not have to be equal to the sum of each component’s value. This degree of 
freedom is highly relevant as in real life buyers often look for concrete sets of different goods. 
Furthermore, the values depend purely on the agents’ own information, i.e. the values are assumed 
to be private. 
21 A natural assumption for the utility of rational individuals is that effort and earnings of a trade can 
be separated from each other. Therefore individual utilities are considered to be quasi-linear in this 
paper. 
    (2.3) 
    (2.4) 
    (2.5) 
(2.6) 
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As a consequence, the utilities of agents who do not trade are assumed to equal 
zero, i.e. 
               
 and                              
 
To derive the approximate efficiency property of the ICDA in section 2.5 two basic 
assumptions concerning the utility functions of the agents are needed. First it is 
convenient to assume that there is at least one specific price vector        and 
respectively one specific bundle     for every buyer     and every seller     
that creates a positive outcome for both. Obviously, this is not a stringent 
assumption because the agents as rational individuals will only participate in the 
double auction if they can expect positive revenue.  
 
Analyzing the definition of the agents’ valuation functions makes it obvious which 
conditions are necessary in order to get an individually rational auction. As rational 
individuals, buyers and sellers will not accept any trade that generates a negative 
outcome for them. Hence, an agent cannot be forced to trade if she cannot expect 
to profit. In this case, when no trade is carried out, the agent’s utility equals zero. 
Considering the utility function of the agents, it is clear that each buyer     will 
gain from trading a concrete bundle     as long as          . Each seller 
   , on the other hand will have a non-negative outcome as long as she sells her 
bundle     with a price which is at least as high as her individual valuation, i.e. if 
         . Otherwise, the seller will not trade. To ensure the non-negativity of 
the agents’ utilities and thus to ensure the individual rationality of the mechanism, 
both conditions have to be satisfied for all trades. 
Another important property a mechanism should provide is budget balance, i.e. 
that the mechanism does not earn or lose money. Obviously, this could be 
achieved if the sum the buyers pay equals the sum the sellers receive for their 
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goods. In order to satisfy this property, the price for each type of good is fixed and 
the same for all agents. In addition, bilateral trades between one seller and one 
buyer are used for allocation. The concept of bilateral trades and the fixing of the 
price guarantees that the ICDA is budget balanced22. 
Finally, the properties incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency, whose 
achievement is more difficult than that of the other two properties, need to be 
observed. A mechanism is called incentive compatible if claiming their true types is 
an optimal strategy for each agent. In other words, it is necessary to ensure that 
there is no strategy creating a higher outcome than that of acting according to the 
individual information. 
As described above, the social goal this paper focuses on is to achieve allocative 
efficiency, i.e. to maximize the overall gain from trade23.  
This property can be described as a solution of the following optimization problem 
            
 
   
            
 
   
     
                   
      
 
Remembering the discussion from the introduction, it is obviously challenging to 
get all agents to act truthfully while, on the other hand, maximizing the common 
gains from trade. The approach of the ICDA to overcome this problem is to 
concentrate on the achievement of incentive compatibility instead of generating a 
fully efficient mechanism. Therefore, the structure of the ICDA is carefully 
constructed to ensure that no agent will have an incentive to misrepresent her true 
values in order to increase her gain from trade. Although this paper focuses on 
ensuring incentive compatibility, it is clear that the loss of efficiency needs to be 
limited. In fact, the loss of efficiency of the mechanism could vanish as the number 
of agents becomes sufficiently large. 
                                               
22 Subsequent it is presented that the bilateral trades are used to clear the market and to exclude 
incentive incompatibilities. 
23 The maximization of the overall gain from trade is the most common social choice function in 
mechanism design. For the sake of simplicity allocative efficiency is often simply called efficiency. 
(2.7) 
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2.3. Concept of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) 
Considering the existing concepts for double auctions, incentive incompatibilities 
arise from the fact that the price definition directly depends on the traders’ bids. 
For instance, the group of k-double auctions (ref. Satterthwaite, 1989) suggests a 
price that is based on the bids of the least efficient pair of traders. As a 
consequence, at least one of these agents has an influence on the trading price, 
i.e. k-double auctions are generally not incentive compatible. 
Therefore, the main idea of the ICDA is to extract a subset of agents from the 
original sets of buyers and sellers. The individual information of the extracted 
agents is used to calculate the trading price and in addition to generate bundles for 
the trade. As the information will be used to derive the trading price vector and to 
define the trading bundles, the selected buyers and sellers have an influence on 
the allocation process. As a result, the agents may find strategies other than 
signaling their true values to increase their individual gains from trade. 
Consequently, the agents that are selected to define the prices must not trade in 
the ICDA in order to give them no incentive to misrepresent their true values. This 
is important to ensure that the mechanism is incentive compatible. 
Afterwards, the auctioneer allocates the bundles to the remaining agents 
according to an allocation rule that will be described in section 2.5. This rationing 
between the agents is necessary to make sure that, on the one hand, the agents 
are motivated to act honestly and, on the other hand, the overall gain from trade is 
maximized. Achieving a balance between incentive compatibility and an 
approximate form of allocative efficiency for the double auction is the main 
difficulty for the construction of the components price definition rule, bundles 
creation rule and allocation rule. 
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Framework of the ICDA 
(1) Each agent is asked to send her individual valuation function to the auctioneer. 
(2) The auctioneer selects             buyers             and   sellers 
             randomly in order to create the trading prices for each good. The 
price of good         is computed by using the information of the individual 
valuations from the selected agents. In addition, the bundles for the auction 
are computed using the individual information (ref. section 2.5). 
As the chosen agents,             and            , define the price and 
the trading bundles, they are removed from the set of the potential traders, i.e. 
       
 
    and  
      
 
   . 
Consequently, the set of the remaining buyers is defined as         and 
that of the remaining sellers as        . 
(3) Next, the auctioneer allocates the goods according to an allocation rule (ref. 
section 2.4). 
(4) Eventually, the agents      and      will participate in the auction with a 
defined trading price of     per unit for good        . The remaining agents 
     and      will not trade, hence their utility equals zero. 
 
Remark: In step (2) of the ICDA the trading price vector                is 
computed by using the individual information collected from the selected agents 
with an arbitrary vector function. The most important fact of the framework of the 
ICDA is that it creates no incentive for any agent to not act truthfully in order to get 
a price that may result in a higher individual outcome. This is true as the agents 
who have an influence on the trading price vector are not allowed to participate in 
the auction. Furthermore, the concrete formulation of the price function can be 
used to improve the efficiency property of the mechanism.   ■ 
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Before introducing a specific allocation rule, it is convenient to analyze which 
properties the framework of the ICDA offers independently of the concrete 
formulation of the allocation rule. First of all, as the principle defines a common 
trading price    and in addition specifies the bundles which are traded, the sellers 
receive exactly the sum paid by the buyers. As a result, no outside subsidies are 
needed. Due to the bilateral trades the mechanism is budget balanced. 
Besides, the formulation of the ICDA ensures that the agents who trade do not 
have an influence on the price vector. As a consequence, the agents have no 
incentive to signal falsely in order to influence the price. But finally, the properties 
individual rationality and incentive compatibility depend on the chosen allocation 
rule. The paper focuses on these properties while generating an appropriate 
allocation rule in section 2.4. As the agents      and      do not participate in 
the mechanism, it is obvious that in general the mechanism does not create a 
completely efficient allocation as the surplus of those agents is lost. Nevertheless, 
the idea of the ICDA is that the efficiency lost by extracting the sample of agents 
becomes negligibly small if the market is sufficiently large. Thereby, it is possible 
to achieve an approximately efficient allocation.    
 
2.4. Definition of the allocation rule 
As mentioned in section 2.1, the aim of this paper is to present an auction that 
achieves budget balance, individual rationality and incentive compatibility at the 
cost of a less efficient allocation. In the following sections the price definition and 
the creation of the bundles are derived. Afterwards, the efficiency properties of the 
ICDA are analyzed in detail. Finally, it is shown that under some assumptions 
concerning the agents’ valuation functions and if the market is large enough the 
loss of efficiency becomes insignificantly small compared to the total gain from 
trade, i.e. the ICDA is asymptotically allocative efficient. 
A core element of the ICDA is the introduction of an allocation rule to decide how 
to distribute the trading bundles. Like the price definition in step (2) of the ICDA 
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and the creation of the bundles, which are explained in the following section, the 
allocation rule plays an important role, as it has to ensure the incentive 
compatibility and the individual rationality during the distribution process of the 
bundles. The complexity concerning the allocation rule arises as in addition to the 
properties incentive compatibility and individual rationality the efficiency of the 
mechanism has to be observed. Subsequently, a simple allocation rule is 
presented that ensures incentive compatibility and individual rationality at the costs 
of a generally low efficiency. 
 
A simple allocation rule (AR1) 
a) Before starting the allocation, a random order             of the buyers from 
   and a random order             of the sellers from  
  are computed. 
The price vector        is computed using an arbitrary function. 
b) Afterwards                different bundles         of the 
heterogeneous goods are built by using the information of the extracted 
agents from   and   .   24 
c) For     to   
If               and               then 
     buys the bundle    from     
Else 
     and      will not trade 
End 
Next 
All agents with an index that exceeds   will not trade. 
                                               
24 The concrete formulation of the bundle creation rule of the ICDA is presented in section 2.6. 
Certainly the allocation rule (AR1) could be used with any bundle creation rule. 
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Proposition 2.1: Regarding an arbitrary trading price vector        and an 
arbitrary bundle creation rule, the simple allocation rule (AR1) is individually 
rational and incentive compatible without further assumptions. 
 
Proof: Each agent is asked once if the proposed bundle is deemed acceptable. 
Therefore no agent is forced to trade if the bundle is not worth enough. 
Consequently, the allocation rule is individually rational as no agent is forced to 
trade if the expected gain from trade is negative. 
As there is exactly one offer by the auctioneer and the order of the agents is 
created randomly, the buyers and sellers have no incentive to signal falsely in 
order to get another bundle. Obviously, the optimal strategy for each agent is to 
accept the bundle offered if and only if the individual utility is non-negative. As a 
result, the allocation rule is individually rational and incentive compatible at the 
same time.   □ 
 
When analyzing the simple allocation rule (AR1), some properties can be found 
quite easily. It is advantageous that it is not necessary to introduce supplementary 
assumptions concerning the agents’ valuation functions to ensure individual 
rationality and incentive compatibility. Additionally, the structure of the allocation 
rule itself is straightforward, comprehensible for the agents and easy to implement.  
On the other hand, the disadvantages of the simple allocation rule are quite 
obvious. A trade between one buyer and one seller is executed if and only if the 
bundle is constructed in a way that the utilities of both agents are non-negative. 
Furthermore, the individual preferences of the agents are not used to increase 
their gain from trade. The efficiency of the simple allocation rule directly depends 
on the homogeneity of the agents’ preferences and in addition on the precision 
with which the bundles are constructed. In general the simple allocation rule 
creates a quite inefficient allocation.  
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In order to improve the efficiency of the allocation rule, it is essential to install a 
mechanism that allows the agents to choose between different bundles. As the 
following allocation rule pays more attention to the agents’ preferences, it creates 
a higher total surplus from trade. 
 
An approximately efficient allocation rule (AR2) 
a) Before starting the allocation, a random order             of the buyers from 
   and a random order             of the sellers from  
  are computed. 
The price vector        is computed using an arbitrary function. 
b) Next,                different bundles         of the   different goods 
are built by using the information of the extracted agents from    and   .   25 
c) Each bundle         that creates a net surplus (considering the trading price 
vector   ) is put on the agent’s individual preference list. These preference lists 
are sorted in an ascending order according to the bundles’ individual value. 
d) Afterwards, the following conditions have to be satisfied: 
d1) All bundles that are in the first position of the preference list of any 
buyer     are removed from the preference list of buyer     with     
       . This is done for all buyers     with             and 
in the equivalent way for all sellers     with            . 
d2) If the number of available bundles exceeds the number of buyers or the 
number of sellers, then the according number of bundles, beginning 
with the highest index, are removed26. 
e) Finally, the remaining agents are allowed to trade the bundle that is in the first 
position of their latest preference list. 
                                               
25 The concrete formulation of the bundle creation rule of the ICDA is presented in section 2.6. 
Certainly the allocation rule (AR2) could be used with any bundle creation rule. 
26 In order to ensure that d1) and d2) are satisfied, both steps may have to be repeated iteratively. 
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Proposition 2.2: The conditions d1) and d2) of allocation rule (AR2) do not create 
incentives to signal false preferences to the auctioneer. 
 
Proof: First of all, as the auctioneer allocates a bundle to the buyer with the 
smallest index and respectively to the seller with the smallest index, according to 
the randomized orders from step a), the agents are indifferent to removing bundles 
from their preference list when they are preferred by a predecessor. This is true, 
because if this bundle is traded and there are multiple solutions for the allocation, 
the buyer or seller with the smallest index will get this bundle. Therefore, condition 
d1) does not create incentives to misrepresent the true values. 
Second, it is obvious that a single agent has only little influence on the number of 
agents involved in the mechanism. It is clear that an agent cannot gain from 
pretending to have an empty preference list and leaving the auction. On the other 
hand, it is not possible for an agent to force other agents to stay in the mechanism 
if they cannot find bundles with an expected surplus or to leave the auction if it is 
beneficial for them to trade. As a result, no agent has an influence on reducing or 
increasing the number of agents. 
Hence, condition d2) is incentive compatible, too.   □ 
 
Proposition 2.3: Conditions d1) and d2) of allocation rule (AR2) guarantee that 
the allocation found in step e) of (AR2) is unique. 
 
Proof: Considering condition d2) it is guaranteed that the number of buyers and 
respectively the number of sellers is at least as high as the number of goods that 
are still available. If this is combined with condition d1), it is clear that all buyers 
have different bundles in the first position of their final preference lists.  
36 
 
Therefore, all remaining bundles relate to exactly one first position of one buyer’s 
and respectively one seller‘s preference list. Consequently, there exists only one 
unique solution of (AR2).   □ 
 
Proposition 2.4: The allocation rule (AR2) is individually rational and incentive 
compatible. Furthermore, (AR2) is strategy proof. 27 
 
Proof: First, the individual rationality of (AR2) is ensured because only 
preferences are considered for which the individual utility is positive. As a result, 
each buyer and each seller either gets a bundle that surely creates a positive 
outcome or they will not trade. Consequently the agents’ gains from trade of (AR2) 
are non-negative. 
Second, the incentive compatibility is guaranteed as conditions d1) and d2) are 
incentive compatible. Due to the rule that only the first choice is allocated to each 
agent, it is clear that signaling the true values to the auctioneer is an optimal 
strategy independently of other agents’ strategies. As a consequence, (AR2) is 
strategy proof.   □ 
 
Considering the findings of the previous sections, the ICDA framework in 
combination with (AR2) forms a budget balanced, incentive compatible and 
individually rational multi-unit double auction. These properties are guaranteed 
without any assumptions concerning the utility functions of the agents. Finally, the 
investigation of the efficiency of the ICDA including the allocation rule (AR2), 
depends on the price definition. 
  
                                               
27 A mechanism is called strategy proof, if revealing the true type is a dominant strategy for all 
agents. 
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Therefore, in section 2.5 the price definition rule and the construction of the 
bundles are developed. Afterwards, in section 2.6 the properties – including also a 
proposition about the efficiency rate – of the ICDA are discussed. 
 
2.5. Creation of the price vector and the trading bundles 
In the previous sections the basic framework of the ICDA and concrete allocation 
rules were presented. The main focus for these components of the ICDA is to 
ensure the properties incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget 
balance independently of the structure of the valuation functions of buyers or 
sellers. In addition, the allocation rule (AR2) is designed to limit the loss of 
efficiency. Finally, the questions of how to define the bundles that could be traded 
and how to create an appropriate price for each good are still unanswered.  
Both the definition of the price vector and the definition of the set of the trading 
bundles have direct influence on the efficiency of the ICDA. As the other intended 
properties incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance are 
already ensured, it is possible to design the price vector and the set of trading 
bundles in a way that maximizes the allocative efficiency. 
An allocative efficient mechanism is defined as a mechanism that maximizes the 
overall gains from trade, i.e. which maximizes the sum of the agents’ net 
surpluses. If it is assumed that the auctioneer has complete information about the 
valuation functions of the buyers and the sellers, allocative efficiency can be 
achieved by solving the maximization problem 
            
 
   
            
 
   
     
                  
  
 
Considering the statements about budget balance and individual rationality, it is 
obvious that the unrestricted formulation of the optimization problem may prevent 
(2.8) 
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the auction to be budget balanced and individually rational. Clearly, the 
unrestricted formulation of the optimization problem has to be modified in order to 
also facilitate budget balance and individual rationality.  
 
As a consequence, the following conditions 
                     
                     
and 
         
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
are added to the unrestricted optimization problem (2.8)28. The result of the 
optimization problem provides the price vector and the trading bundles for a 
double auction with heterogeneous goods. 
Considering the remarks about incentive compatibility above, it is quite obvious 
that it is not possible to use the information of all agents’ preferences because this 
would create incentives to increase one’s personal outcome by misrepresenting 
one’s true values. Therefore only the valuation functions of the agents that are 
taken out of the original sets and will not trade can be used for computing the 
optimal price vector and the trading bundles. 
  
                                               
28 These constraints are necessary to ensure that the outcome for each agent is non-negative and 
that the payments equal the earnings. As the ICDA uses bilateral trades it is enough to assume 
that the number of sold goods equals the number of bought goods. Thus the solution of the 
optimization problem also pays attention to the properties budget balance and individual rationality. 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
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Consequently, the price vector and the bundles of the ICDA are computed by 
solving the optimization problem 
     
     
   
 
   
      
     
   
 
   
     
    
      
     
      
  
 
with the constraints 
         
              
    
                  
and 
      
         
       
      
 
 
Taking into account that bilateral trades are used in the ICDA for the exchange of 
goods, the third restriction of the optimization problem has to be modified. Instead 
of the overall sum of traded goods the number of traded goods for each deal has 
to be equal29. 
Eventually, the price definition of the ICDA depends on the solution of the 
nonlinear optimization problem (2.11), for which reason the theory about solving 
(2.11) is important for the numerical implementation of the ICDA. Considering, for 
instance, the third constraint, it is clear that in general the optimization problem 
(2.11) has more than one solution. There exist several numerical methods such as 
penalty algorithms, evolutionary algorithms or algorithms based on the steepest 
descent that provide adequate approaches for an effective and efficient solution of 
(2.11). 
  
                                               
29 Obviously the modification of the third constraint generally leads to a lower efficiency. In the 
following chapter it is shown under which assumptions asymptotical allocative efficiency can still be 
achieved. 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
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2.6. Characteristics of the  Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) 
In the previous sections the structure of the ICDA and the formulation of the 
different components of the ICDA were developed. The focus of these sections 
was to install a double auction that ensures the properties budget balance, 
incentive compatibility and individual rationality without further assumptions. As a 
summary, the ICDA is budget balanced, individually rational and incentive 
compatible without any assumptions concerning the agents’ valuation functions. 
Finally, the proof of the efficiency property of the presented double auction is 
addressed in this section. Therefore, the assumptions, ensuring that the allocation 
computed by the ICDA is approximately allocative efficient, are discussed. 
 
Definition: A mechanism is called asymptotically allocative efficient if the loss of 
efficiency becomes negligibly small compared to the overall gain from trade when 
the number of agents is sufficiently large. 
 
Proposition 2.5: Considering multi-unit auctions, the ICDA is asymptotically 
allocative efficient, if the conditions 
(2.14) the valuation functions of the buyers are limited by an upper bound  
                  for a       
(2.15) there exist a lower bound     with: 
for each buyer      there is a subset        for which at least one 
       exists that                                  
and additionally                           holds, 
for each seller      there is a subset        for which at least one 
       exists that                                 holds 
and additionally                         holds, 
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(2.16) all buyers’ valuation functions are taken from the same distribution and 
all sellers’ valuation functions are taken from the same distribution, i.e. 
            and            
(2.17) the agents’ valuation functions are independent 
are satisfied. 
 
Proof: First, it is important to show that for       the possibility that each agent 
could trade an acceptable bundle converges to 1, if condition (2.15) is fulfilled. 
Within the price definition from the ICDA, the information from the sample of 
agents extracted in step (1) is used to approximate the valuation distributions of 
buyers and sellers. According to mathematical statistics, an empirical distribution 
function converges almost surely to the true distribution function if condition (2.16) 
and (2.17) hold and the size of the sample converges to infinity. Consequently, the 
information of the sample is a good approximation for the exact distribution 
function of the agents’ valuations if   is sufficiently large. This is true because the 
assumption                holds. 
Finally, it is necessary to show that the loss of efficiency due to the extraction of a 
subset of agents converges to zero if the market is sufficiently large. 
Regarding assumption (2.14), the loss of efficiency from the extraction of the 
sample is limited by 
      
       
      
      
       
      
         
 
As long as the net surplus of the trades grows faster than     , the loss of 
efficiency caused by the extraction of the agents in step (1) of the ICDA becomes 
negligibly small. This is true because according to assumption (2.15) there exists a 
solution to the optimization problem (2.11) in which each agent gets the chance to 
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trade an acceptable bundle. In fact, for each       and each     with      
exists for which                          . 
Consequently, the loss of efficiency due to the extraction of the sample becomes 
negligibly small compared to the total surplus of the allocation, i.e. 
          
                       
  
          
                       
  
 
      
       
         
       
      
   
 
                                                                         
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                                                                      
 
 
 
 
   
                        
 
As a consequence, the ICDA is asymptotically allocative efficient if conditions 
(2.14) to (2.17) of the proposition above are satisfied.   □ 
 
Remark: Regarding the conditions from above, (2.17) is needed to ensure 
homogeneity of the buyer-seller structure if multiple goods have to be allocated. 
Therefore, it follows that if the ICDA is applied for single-unit auctions it is 
asymptotically allocative efficient even without (2.15). In worst case, if there is no 
similarity between the buyers’ acceptable bundles and the sellers’ acceptable 
bundles the ICDA will not compute an adequate allocation.  ■ 
 
To complete the review of the efficiency of the ICDA, it is necessary to analyze the 
ICDA if conditions (2.14) or (2.15) are not satisfied. First, condition (2.14) is 
needed to limit the loss of efficiency that occurs from the extraction of agents from 
the original set of traders. Obviously, the maximum valuation of each agent for one 
bundle has to be bounded by a      . Otherwise, if an agent’s valuation for a 
single bundle cannot be limited, i.e. becomes infinitely large, the loss of efficiency 
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cannot be balanced in case this agent is extracted. Analogously, it is necessary to 
ensure that the utility of a trade has a lower bound. Both assumptions are close to 
real life and no strong limitations. 
The similarity condition (2.15) ensures that every buyer could find a seller with the 
bundle that is acceptable for both of them. If condition (2.15) is not satisfied, then 
the ICDA will not converge to asymptotic efficiency even if condition (2.14) is true. 
That characteristic is due to the definition of the ICDA that allows only bilateral 
trades in order to ensure incentive compatibility. In the worst case, if there is no 
overlap between the distributions of the buyers’ and sellers’ valuation functions, no 
trade will be carried out and consequently the efficiency equals zero. 
 
2.7. Discussion of the properties of the Incentive Compatible Double 
Auction (ICDA) 
In the previous sections a double auction is presented that focuses on achieving a 
budget balanced, individually rational and incentive compatible allocation in single-
unit as well as in multi-unit markets with heterogeneous goods. Due to this 
concentration on achieving incentive compatibility without any assumption 
concerning the agents’ values or bidding behavior, the resulting efficiency of the 
ICDA directly depends on the homogeneity of the buyer-seller-structure. The 
minimum requirement of the ICDA is that each buyer could find at least one bundle 
acceptable to trade it with a seller and vice versa. 
 
One element of the ICDA to ensure incentive compatibility is the bilateral trade that 
is used during the allocation phase of the double auction. A conceivable relaxation 
would be to replace the one-on-one trade of (AR2) in step (3) of the proposed 
double auction by a continuing trade rule. For this, the order of the buyers and 
sellers computed at the beginning of (AR2) is also used to allocate the goods. 
Starting with the lowest index       each buyer               and each 
seller               trades her preferred bundle as long as the remaining 
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demand or respectively the remaining offer is sufficient. It is obvious that in the 
worst case the allocation would conclude with     agents not having been able to 
trade their complete bundle. As a consequence, these     agents may have an 
incentive to signal false values during the allocation phase in order to increase 
their individual gain from trade. The incentive to act dishonestly could be reduced 
by the auctioneer with a compensation for the open trades at the cost of the 
budget balance of the double auction. Certainly, even with such a compensation 
by the auctioneer an incentive for the up to     agents remains to increase their 
gains from trade by acting dishonestly. Therefore, the ICDA was developed to 
consequently exclude incentives to misrepresent the true values. 
 
In summary, the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) provides the 
important properties budget balance, individual rationality, incentive compatibility 
and strategy proofness without any assumptions concerning the agents’ individual 
valuation functions, even for the complex economic environment of a multi-unit 
market with heterogeneous goods. Thereby the ICDA enlarges the existing 
approaches of double auctions, which predominantly concentrate on the efficiency 
of the mechanism and as a result only achieve approximate formulations of 
incentive compatibility or budget balance. Especially for the complex economic 
environments of markets with several heterogeneous goods, the ICDA strikes a 
new path. 
Due to the structure of the mechanism, the achievement of approximate allocative 
efficiency for multi-unit markets depends on the homogeneity of the agents’ 
valuation functions. In order to achieve efficiency, a kind of symmetry between the 
distribution of the valuation functions of buyers and sellers is needed. Ensuring the 
approximate formulation of allocative efficiency requires that each buyer could find 
a seller for a one-on-one trade. Otherwise, it is not guaranteed that the ICDA will 
achieve approximate allocative efficiency even if the number of agents increases. 
By contrast, for the less complex single-unit market the approximate efficiency is 
also ensured without assumption (2.15) concerning the agents’ valuations. As a 
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consequence, the field of application in multi-unit markets is close to economic 
environments that provide the required symmetry between buyers and seller. 
Markets of goods that are naturally summed up in sets, such as markets for the 
sale of stamps or coins, ensure the buyer-seller symmetry needed. 
Actually, the dependence of the efficiency property on the similarity of the buyers’ 
and the sellers’ preferences is due to the bilateral trades used for the allocation. 
Certainly, bilateral trades are needed in the ICDA to clear the market, preventing 
incentive incompatibilities. A modified double auction that also allows trades 
between groups of buyers and sellers instead of using only bilateral trades is 
conceivable. However, the use of an allocation rule that is based on multilateral 
trades would increase the efficiency properties of the ICDA at the expense of 
incentive compatibility. 
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3. An Alternating-Price Auction for Interdependent-Valuation Environments 
 
Abstract 
In the following chapter a dynamic auction is presented that computes an incentive 
compatible and ex-post efficient allocation for multi-unit environments with bidders 
having interdependent values. The concept of the dynamic auction is to implement 
several rounds of biddings to enclose an ex-post efficient allocation. 
To achieve this, the auctioneer announces varying trading prices each round and 
afterwards reveals the corresponding biddings of all agents. Additionally, the 
proposed double auction requests less individual information from the buyers as 
known static auctions. 
Due to the concept of announcing prices and revealing the bids, the dynamic 
auction constructs an allocation that is incentive compatible, individually rational 
and ex-post efficient at the same time. Therewith, the Alternating Price Auction 
enhances the existing concepts of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions that make 
explicit assumptions concerning the bidding behavior. 
 
3.1. Introduction into ex-post efficient auction design 
Even 60 years after its publication, Vickrey’s article “Counterspeculation, Auctions 
and Competitive Sealed Tenders” is still one of the most important papers of 
mechanism design, providing the fundamentals for implementing an incentive 
compatible and efficient auction. The main aspect of Vickrey’s analysis is that first-
price auctions assist rational individuals to misrepresent their true values (ref. 
Vickrey, 1961, pp. 20-22). Indeed, agents may find strategies other than bidding 
truthfully to increase their individual gain from trade. Consequently, bidding 
truthfully is not a dominant strategy if the price is set according to the first price 
rule.  
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Moreover, Vickrey’s solution to overcome the direct dependence between trading 
price and winner’s bid is to install auctions in which the winner has to pay a price 
equal to the second highest bid. The implementation of the second-price rule 
effects that truth-telling becomes a weakly dominant strategy in private-valuation 
environments. 
Unfortunately, the VCGm fail to achieve ex-post efficient allocations if the buyers’ 
values are affiliated30. In short, difficulties arise when the agents reconsider their 
bids after getting information about the opponents’ bids. This observation of the 
opponents’ bids could happen during the auction or even after it, when the goods 
have already been allocated. Due to the unique properties of the VCGm31 there 
are several papers that attempt to extend their principles to interdependent-
valuation environments. Among others, Milgrom and Weber developed a 
mechanism based on the concept first proposed by Vickrey, which offers better 
properties for interdependent-valuation environments (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). 
They presented a second-price auction which is efficient for symmetric bidders 
whose values satisfy a single-crossing property. 
Another interesting approach among the group of static auctions for 
interdependent-valuation environments was published in Dasgupta’s and Maskin’s 
paper “Efficient Auctions”. The proposed auction is based on giving the auctioneer 
more information about the buyers’ valuation functions. Therefore, each agent is 
asked to send her bidding strategy regarding all possible offers by other agents to 
the auctioneer who afterwards computes an allocation by using this information. 
Obviously this auction forces the agents to reveal their personal information, for 
which reason it is not detail-free32. However Dasgupta’s and Maskin’s 
                                               
30 In 1992 Maskin showed that for a single-unit-market with two buyers whose valuations are 
interdependent the VCGm are ex-post efficient while for environments with more than two buyers 
standard simultaneous mechanisms fail to achieve ex-post efficiency in interdependent valuation 
environments. 
31 The generalized VCGm maximize the outcome among all efficient auctions for multiple goods 
(ref. Krishna, Perry, 1997, p. 4). 
32 In 1985 Wilson analyzed the existing approaches of auction design whereat he created the 
request that auctions have to be less dependent of the bidders’ valuation function and the joint 
distribution of the private information. Auctions that do not directly depend on the agents’ values 
are called detail-free. 
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generalization of the VCGm generates an ex-post efficient outcome for agents 
having interdependent, one-dimensional values (ref. Dasgupta, Maskin, 2000, p. 
361). 
 
A different concept to achieve ex-post efficiency for interdependent-valuation 
environments is to give the buyers the chance to reconsider their biddings by 
revealing the offers of all agents. One of these mechanisms was proposed by 
Perry and Reny in 2002. The authors suggest an auction in which each agent is 
given the chance to reconsider her initial bid by gathering information about the 
bids of her opponents (ref. Perry & Reny, 2002). Perry and Reny manage this by 
revealing the first-round bids of all agents and introducing a second round of 
bidding. In fact, the mechanism consists of several rounds of two-bidders, single-
unit second-price auctions similar to those of the VCGm. As these second round 
bids depend on the information of the initial bids of the other agents, it is possible 
to create an ex-post efficient allocation for a multi-unit auction with bidders having 
interdependent values. 
 
Besides the group of static auctions, the concept of dynamic auctions designed for 
economic environments with bidders having interdependent values seems to be 
promising. Ausubel, for instance, proposed in “An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction 
for Multiple Objects” a dynamic auction for interdependent-valuation environments 
(ref. Ausubel, 2004, pp. 1). Although the presented auction requires relatively 
severe assumptions concerning the buyers’ bidding behavior, it offers interesting 
insights. The main advantage of dynamic auctions over static auctions is that they 
do not force the agents to reveal their private information completely. In fact, the 
auctioneer demands only a finite number of bids from each agent instead of 
collecting each individual’s valuation function. Consequently, the group of dynamic 
auctions enables the creation of a detail-free mechanism for interdependent-
valuation environments in such a way Wilson requested it.  
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Certainly, as dynamic auctions have less information available this group of 
auctions requests regularity conditions to converge. Otherwise, without such 
regularity conditions, the dynamic auction will not find an equilibrium after a finite 
number of steps33. Ausubel wants to prevent the agent from waiting to bid truthfully 
until the end of the auction (ref. Ausubel, 2004, p. 9). Therefore, he assumes for 
the Ascending-Bid Auction each agent to follow an activity rule that specifies that 
bids have to be monotonically decreasing. In fact, there exist problems for which 
agents may want to increase their offer according to their true types although the 
activity rule excludes this bidding behavior (ref. Example 2 in section 3.3). The 
idea of the Alternating-Price Auction proposed in chapter 3 is to relax Ausubel’s 
activity rule by introducing an assumption that makes a constraint on the 
aggregate demand. 
 
Since the 1990s the applications of interdependent-valuation auction grew as 
bigger and bigger auctions were held to sell public goods, such as infrastructure 
projects or new bandwidth that allow telecommunication companies to enlarge 
their portfolio (ref. Binmore & Klemperer, 2001 and McAfee, McMillan & Wilkie, 
2009). As expectations concerning the economic benefit from sales of e.g. the 
next generation bandwidth called 3G were extremely high, it is likely that the 
biddings of the agents are affiliated. The interdependence of the buyers’ values is 
due to the enormous expected prices for the traded goods and the uncertainty 
about the de facto economic benefit that will be become apparent only years after 
the auction. As a consequence, the fear of overpaying brings the agents to include 
the information they can get from their opponents’ values in their own bidding 
strategy. Hence, the development of auction designs that achieve ex-post efficient 
allocation even if the buyers’ valuations are interdependent is highly relevant. 
 
                                               
33 In fact, if complete and perfect information could be supposed agents have an optimal strategy to 
finish the auction quickest possible, just as in the Rubinstein-bargaining-model. For the two-bidders 
Ascending-Price Auction with complete and perfect information the auction ends after two rounds. 
The optimal strategy for the first agent is to offer a bid that is acceptable for the second agent just 
in the first round (ref. Ausubel & Schwartz, 1999, p. 11). 
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In this chapter a dynamic auction is presented that expands the concept of 
Ausubels Ascending-Bid Auction by using an alternating-price rule instead of 
monotonically increasing the trading price in each round. Consequently, the 
concept of the proposed Alternating-Price Auction that follows the concepts of the 
Walrasian tatonnement is to enclose an optimal trading price in a way that the 
resulting allocation is incentive compatible, individually rational and ex-post 
efficient. In addition, the Alternating-Price Auction needs less information from the 
buyers compared to known static auctions as it only asks the agents to reveal their 
bids along the path to the identified optimal allocation. Furthermore, the agents 
also receive information about their opponents’ bids after the end of each round. 
Therefore, this concept appears more transparent and fairer. 
 
Thus, in the following section 3.2 the chapter starts with defining the setting of 
environments with buyers having interdependent values. Afterwards, the desired 
properties incentive compatibility, individual rationality and ex-post efficiency are 
discussed. In section 3.3 the structure of the Alternating-Price Auction is 
introduced. Finally, the convergence criteria and the properties of the Alternating-
Price Auction are proved and discussed in the sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
3.2. Setting of an interdependent-valuation environment 
Before starting to explain the Alternating-Price Auction, it is convenient to 
introduce the setting of interdependent-valuation environments this paper focuses 
on. First of all, the economic environment consists of         different buyers 
             that participate in a multi-unit, one-sided auction. Consequently, 
each buyer is given the opportunity to buy a subset of the      identical copies 
of one type of good the auctioneer puts up for sale. 
The individual demand of each buyer            is expressed by the real value 
     . In interdependent-valuation environments the valuation of a single buyer 
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does not inevitably depend solely on her individual demand, but may also depend 
on the demands of her opponents. Therefore, the valuation of buyer            
is a function of all buyers’ individual demands, i.e. it is defined as the function 
                  with the real-valued vector             containing all 
buyers’ demands. 
In addition to the individual valuation function of all agents, the buyers’ utilities also 
depend on the market price     . If it is assumed that buyers have quasi-linear 
utilities34, the utility function of every buyer            can be described by 
                             35 
 
In case buyer      requests no goods, i.e.     , the utility should equal zero, 
i.e. participating in the one-sided auction does not present an effort. Thus, it is 
assumed that the utility of each buyer      equals zero, if she requests no goods 
irrespective of the other buyers’ demands, i.e. 
                         
 
Taking into account the market price announced by the auctioneer, each agent is 
given the chance to consider her information about the demand of the other 
buyers and to proclaim her individual demand consistent to her individual values 
and the information about the other buyers’ demands. 
Furthermore, this bidding strategy is defined by 
                
for each buyer           .  
                                               
34 A natural assumption for the utility of rational individuals is that effort and earnings of one trade 
can be separated from each other. Therefore, individual utilities are considered to be quasi-linear in 
this paper. 
35 The index –   is used to specify the indices unequal to    , i.e. –                . 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
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Assuming the agents are interested in maximizing their outcome, the bidding 
strategy can be expressed by 
                      
  
              36 
A basic assumption for the auction is that there is competition for every unit of the 
good the auctioneer wants to sell. Consequently, it is assumed that there exists a 
price        for which the demand exceeds the supply, i.e. 
                   
 
   
        
 
Additionally, it is assumed that there exists a price      with             for 
which the supply exceeds the demand, i.e. 
                   
 
   
        
 
Obviously, assumptions (3.5) and (3.6) are necessary in order to ensure that there 
exists a trading price that balances out demand and offer. 
In the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) the auctioneer adjusts the trading price 
according to the buyers’ demands of the previous round. In order to ensure the 
convergence of the APA, it is necessary to have a good estimation of how the sum 
of the buyers’ demand changes in consideration of the proposed new trading 
price. Naturally, it is likely that the overall demand increases if the market price 
declines, and decreases if the market price rises.  
 
 
                                               
36 The properties of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) do not depend on the concrete formulation 
of the bidding strategy.  
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
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(3.7) 
(3.8) 
As a consequence, it is assumed that: 
If the market price increases, the sum of the buyers’ demand decreases, i.e. 
                
 
   
                  
 
   
                      
If the market price decreases, the sum of the buyers’ demand increases, i.e. 
                
 
   
                  
 
   
                      
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to limit the dependence of the utility functions on the 
opponents’ demands. This assumption is required to ensure that the auction 
converges to an equilibrium. Otherwise, if the dependence on the opponents’ 
demands is not limited appropriately, the agents will want to change their bidding 
after the end of the APA. Hence, the strategy functions have to be more sensitive 
to changes of the individual demand than to changes of the demand of the other 
agents: 
                                                 
with      . 37 
 
Remark: In fact, assumption (3.9) can be relaxed so that the set of inequalities 
has to be true after a finite number of steps. In other words, the dynamic auction 
APA converges if – after an initial phase of bidding – the agents’ response function 
depends more on the own than on the opponents’s changes in bids. For the sake 
of simplicity and without loss of generality it is assumed that (3.9.) has to be 
satisfied throughout the auction.   ■ 
 
                                               
37      labels the 1-norm which is used as vector norm in this paper. The 1-norm is defined as 
          . 
(3.9) 
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In addition to (3.2), it is assumed that the buyers only trade if their revenue is 
strictly positive, i.e.  
                    
 
 
3.3. Concept of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 
In summary, the main idea of the Alternating-Price Auction is to install an 
enclosure algorithm for the market price that converges to a price which 
corresponds to an ex-post efficient allocation. Therefore, the auctioneer 
announces a trading price       and afterwards reveals the referring bids of all 
buyers38. After each buyer has reconsidered her bid, having the information of the 
previous rounds of bidding, the next price is made known and again the agents are 
asked to send their bids to the auctioneer.  
Remembering that the auctioneer wants to sell exactly     goods, it is obvious 
that the sum of the buyers’ optimal demands has to equal the number of available 
goods, i.e. 
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
Consequently, the iteration has to be repeated until condition (3.11) is satisfied. 
The goal is to reduce the difference between the buyers’ demand and the number 
of available goods by each step of the iteration.  
 
 
 
                                               
38 The index      labels the actual step of the iteration. 
(3.11) 
(3.10) 
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Hence, the auction shall ensure the convergence conditions 
   
   
            
for the price sequence and 
 
   
   
   
 
 
   
   
for the sequence of the buyers’ demands. 
 
Obviously, the price has to be adjusted according to the actual deviation between 
the buyers’ demand and the number of available goods. If the buyers’ demand is 
unequal to the number of available goods, the price has to be modified according 
to the following rule, which is a consequence of conditions (3.7) and (3.8): 
If  
   
 
 
   
   
the price has to be increased, i.e.        . 
If 
   
 
 
   
   
the price has to be decreased, i.e.         . 
 
The concept of the APA is to increase the price when the demand of the buyers 
exceeds the number of available goods and vice versa.  
  
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
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Consequently, it is necessary to start the iteration with a pair of prices      and 
     that ensure the enclosure criteria (3.5) and (3.6): 
                       
 
   
       
and 
                       
 
   
        
 
After this initial phase, the auctioneer starts the iteration consisting of several 
rounds of announcing a price and afterwards revealing the buyers’ bids. The APA 
is formulated as follows. 
 
Definition of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 
(i) The iteration starts with the initial prices        ,         that are 
chosen by the auctioneer according to condition (3.14) for      and 
respectively for     . 
(ii)     
Choose        for the abort criteria of the auction. 
While      
  
           and    
          
        
a) If    
  
      and    
    
       
Then the new trading price is computed by 
       
 
           
 
 
(3.14) 
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b) Else If    
  
      and    
    
      
Then the new trading price is computed by 
       
 
           
 
c) Else If    
  
      and    
    
      
Then the new trading price is computed by 
                 
 
d) Else If    
  
      and    
    
      
Then the new trading price is computed by 
                 
      End If 
 
The auctioneer proclaims the new price      and in addition the 
demands       
  
     
 from the previous round. 
Afterwards, the buyers            are asked to send their 
individual demands 
  
             
        
consistent with the price    and the other buyers’ demands of the 
round before. 
End While 
(iii) Finally, the optimal allocation is defined by       
and the price      . 
 
Next, two examples are presented in order to illustrate how the APA works. In 
addition, it is explained why the assumptions made in section 3.2 are needed to 
ensure the convergence of the APA. 
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Example 1 
First, a two-buyers auction is studied where the agents have the following utility 
functions 
       
 
         
for buyer    and 
       
 
         
for buyer   . It is assumed that the auctioneer wants to sell      identical copies 
of one good. 
Obviously, condition (3.9) is not satisfied, i.e. the agents’ utilities depend more on 
their opponents’ than on their own demand. As a consequence the bidding 
strategies will oscillate between 0 and 10 and the APA does not converge to an 
equilibrium. 
Results of the APA for example 1: 
                                                                                         
  
                 
        
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- 
1                 0.00000             10.00000             10.00000              10.00000                 0.00000 
2            1000.00000              0.00000               0.00000             - 10.00000            1000.00000 
3             500.00000               0.00000               0.00000            - 10.00000             500.00000 
4                 0.00000             10.00000              10.00000              10.00000             500.00000 
5             250.00000               0.00000               0.00000             - 10.00000             250.00000 
6             125.00000               0.00000               0.00000             - 10.00000             125.00000 
7                 0.00000             10.00000              10.00000              10.00000             125.00000 
8               62.50000               0.00000               0.00000             - 10.00000              62.50000 
9               31.25000             10.00000               0.00000                 0.00000              31.25000 
10                0.00000            10.00000              10.00000               10.00000               31.25000 
11             15.62500               0.00000                0.00000             - 10.00000              15.62500 
12               7.81250             10.00000              10.00000               10.00000               7.81250 
13             11.71875               0.00000                0.00000             - 10.00000               3.90625 
14               9.76563             10.00000              10.00000               10.00000               1.95313 
15             10.74219               0.00000                0.00000             - 10.00000               0.97656 
 
…            …        …                       …                        …        … 
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…            …        …                       …                        …        … 
 
30              3.41797               0.00000              10.00000                0.00000                0.48828 
31              2.92969               0.00000                0.00000            - 10.00000                0.48828 
32              2.44141             10.00000                0.00000                0.00000                0.48828 
33              1.95313               0.00000                0.00000            - 10.00000                0.48828 
34              1.46484               0.00000              10.00000                0.00000                0.48828 
35              0.97656               0.00000                0.00000            - 10.00000                0.48828 
36              0.48828             10.00000                0.00000                0.00000                0.48828 
37              0.00000             10.00000              10.00000               10.00000               0.48828 
38              0.24414               0.00000              10.00000                0.00000                0.24414 
39              0.12207             10.00000              10.00000               10.00000               0.12207 
40              0.18311             10.00000                0.00000                 0.00000               0.06104 
 
…            …        …                       …                        …        … 
 
            ■ 
 
 
Example 2 
In order to highlight the differences between the Ascending-Bid Auction and the 
Alternating-Price Auction, an example is presented in which     identical copies 
of one good are put up for sale in a two-buyers auction. The individual utility 
functions are 
                         
for buyer    and 
                         
for buyer   . 
 
First of all, the results of the Ascending-Bid Auction are studied. At a trading price 
       the Ascending-Bid Auction stops as the demand of buyer    equals zero. 
Consequently, the goods are allocated to    at a price of       . However, if    
was given the chance to reconsider her bid, she would subsequently increase her 
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demand. Indeed, the utility functions of this example violate the assumption of 
monotone bidding the Ascending-Bid Auction presumes.  
 
Results of the Ascending-Bid Auction for example 2: 
                                                                                         
  
        
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     0                 0.00                  7.0                   7.0                   7.0 
     1                 0.01                  7.0                   7.0                   7.0 
     2                 0.02                  7.0                   7.0                   7.0 
 
   …            …        …                  …              … 
 
   53                 0.53                  7.0                   7.0                   7.0 
   54                 0.54                  7.0                   7.0                   7.0 
   55                 0.55                  7.0                   0.0                   0.0 
   56                 0.56                  0.0                   0.0                  -7.0 
   57                 0.57                  0.0                   7.0                   0.0 
   58                 0.58                  0.0                   7.0                   0.0 
   59                 0.59                  0.0                   7.0                   0.0 
 
   …            …        …                  …              … 
 
   77                 0.77                  0.0                   7.0                   0.0 
   78                 0.78                  0.0                   7.0                   0.0 
   79                 0.79                  0.0                   7.0                   0.0 
   80                 0.80                  0.0                   7.0                   0.0 
   81                 0.81                  0.0                   7.0                  -0.0 
   82                 0.82                  0.0                   0.0                  -7.0 
 
   …            …        …                  …              … 
 
   99                 0.99                  0.0                   0.0                  -7.0 
 100                 1.00                  0.0                   0.0                  -7.0 
 
 
By contrast, the Alternating-Price Auction allows the buyers to consider the 
biddings of their opponents and to increase or decrease their demand for the next 
round of the auction. The assumption of monotone bidding is replaced by (3.7) and 
(3.8) that focus on the common bidding behavior instead of that of the individuals. 
If the APA is carried out with          and       , the iteration terminates after 
31 steps. All of the goods are allocated to    at a price of          . 
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Results of the APA for example 2: 
  
                                                                                           
  
                 
              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  1               0.00000              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.00000 
  2           100.00000              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000           100.00000 
  3             50.00000              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000             50.00000 
  4               0.00000              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000             50.00000 
  5             25.00000              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000             25.00000 
  6             12.50000              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000             12.50000 
  7               0.00000              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000             12.50000 
  8               6.25000              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000               6.25000 
  9               3.12500              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000               3.12500 
 10              0.00000              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               3.12500 
 11              1.56250              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000               1.56250 
 12              0.78125              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000               0.78125 
 13              0.00000              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.78125 
 14              0.39063              0.00000               7.00000               0.00000               0.39063 
 15              0.19531              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.19531 
 16              0.29297              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.09766 
 17              0.39063              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.09766 
 18              0.48828              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.09766 
 19              0.58594              0.00000               0.00000              -7.00000               0.09766 
 20              0.53711              7.00000               0.00000               0.00000               0.04883 
 21              0.48828              0.00000               7.00000               0.00000               0.04883 
 22              0.43945              0.00000               7.00000               0.00000               0.04883 
 23              0.39063              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.04883 
 24              0.41504              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.02441 
 25              0.43945              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.02441 
 26              0.46387              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.02441 
 27              0.48828              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.02441 
 28              0.51270              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.02441 
 29              0.53711              7.00000               0.00000               0.00000               0.02441 
 30              0.52490              7.00000               7.00000               7.00000               0.01221 
 31              0.53101              0.00000               7.00000               0.00000               0.00610 
            
            ■ 
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3.4. Characteristics of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are static auctions for interdependent-
valuation environments that are incentive compatible, individually rational and ex-
post allocative efficient without strong assumption concerning the buyers’ valuation 
functions. On the other hand, these concepts require complete information from 
the agents to compute an efficient allocation. Consequently, the idea of this paper 
is to introduce a multi-unit auction for interdependent-valuation environments that 
also achieves incentive compatibility, individual rationality and ex-post allocative 
efficiency, but at the same time is less complex. Indeed, the main aspect of the 
Alternating-Price Auction is that less individual information is required to find an 
appropriate allocation. As a result, the proposed mechanism appears more 
transparent and fairer to the bidders. 
In example 2 the APA achieves an incentive compatible and ex-post efficient 
allocation. Finally, it is left open to prove the properties of the APA in general 
considering the assumptions made in section 3.2. 
 
First, it is necessary to examine whether the APA converges if assumptions (3.5) – 
(3.8) are true. As discussed in section 3.3, the idea of the APA is that the market 
price converges, and at the same time the sum of the buyers’ demand converges 
to the supply.  
In order to converge to a fixed trading price, it is essential that the APA satisfies 
the convergence criteria  
                    
and 
         
   
      
 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
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Proposition 3.1: The multi-unit auction APA proposed in section 3.3 satisfies 
conditions (3.15) and, in addition, (3.16). 
 
Proof: In order to prove (3.15), it is necessary to investigate each case of step (ii) 
of the APA separately. 
a), b)             
 
               
 
 
     
 
 
    
     
 
 
                     
c), d)                                    
As a consequence,                     is satisfied. 
As a summary, the APA of section 3.3 satisfies condition (3.15), i.e. the series of 
the price differences           is monotonically decreasing. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to show that (3.16) is true, too. 
If one considers assumptions (3.5) and (3.6), then there exist an upper and a 
lower bound of the market price. Therefore, it is ensured that after a finite number 
of iterations the new price is built according to case a) or case b) of step (ii), i.e. 
                   . As a consequence, the series of the price differences 
          converges to 0 if    .   □ 
 
Proposition 3.2: For each pair of        there exists a     that satisfies 
   
   
 
   
    
with             and            . 
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Proof: Considering proposition 3.1, it is clear that there exists a     for which 
           . It follows from assumptions (3.7) to (3.9) that changes of the 
demand functions vanish if          
   
    .  
In addition, it is ensured that there exists an index     for which    
  
    equals 
the limit from the left due to condition (3.10). Taking into consideration that the 
mechanism encloses the equilibrium price by each step of the iteration, it follows 
from (3.9) and the Banach fixed point theorem that even     
           for a 
   .   □ 
 
Proposition 3.3: The APA is incentive compatible and individually rational. 
 
Proof: First, the individual rationality of the dynamic auction APA is ensured 
because trades are only carried out after the agents place a bid. As a result, each 
agent only trades if she expects positive revenue at the announced trading price. 
Consequently, the agents’ expected outcome of the dynamic auction APA is non-
negative, i.e. the mechanism is individually rational. 
As the found allocation    satisfies condition (3.12) and in addition condition 
(3.13), the APA ensures that         
     
                . As a consequence, the 
APA is incentive compatible.   □ 
 
3.5. Discussion of the properties of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 
In recent years several interesting concepts were developed that deal with 
achieving ex-post efficient allocations in interdependent-valuation environments. 
This chapter proposes a dynamic auction that is based on the idea of enclosing 
the trading price. The concept of announcing a certain price and revealing the 
accompanying bids limits the information that is needed compared to well-known 
existing static auctions. Indeed, the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) collects only a 
65 
 
finite number of biddings instead of accumulating the complete valuation function 
from every buyer. Furthermore, each buyer receives transparency about the bids 
of her opponents. Although the APA is less complex, it provides the important 
properties individual rationality, incentive compatibility and ex-post allocative 
efficiency. 
 
Compared to Ausubels Ascending-Bid Auction, the APA needs less severe 
assumptions concerning the buyers’ bidding behavior. In fact, the convergence 
criterion of the Ascending-Bid Auction depends on the assumption that the 
biddings have to be monotonically decreasing throughout the auction. As a 
consequence, there exist economic environments for which the Ascending-Bid 
Auction fails to achieve an ex-post efficient allocation (ref. Example 2 in section 
3.3). As a summary, the APA enlarges the existing approaches of dynamic 
auctions for interdependent-valuation environments. 
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4. Facilitating Short-Term and Long-Term Efficiency with an Integrated 
Electricity Market Design 
 
Abstract 
An electricity market design is introduced that focuses on building an integrated 
market for energy supplies by considering all relevant participants. More precisely, 
producers and consumers of electric energy are part of the market design as well 
as investors and service providers of the transmission network. 
The main aspect of the integrated market is to overcome the free-riders problem 
that arises when investments in network capacities have to be averaged. A main 
idea of the proposed electricity market design is to make use of known techniques 
of optimal flow problems. Therefore, the efficient development of transport 
capacities is facilitated while, at the same time, short-term allocative efficiency is 
ensured if transport capacities are sufficient. 
 
4.1. Introduction into electricity market designs 
Considering the modeling of electricity markets, it is inevitably to be aware of the 
main features that distinguish power trades from other markets. Unlike other 
commodities, the trade of electricity, gas or water requires an adequate network to 
directly connect buyers and sellers. Taking into consideration that these network 
capacities are durable, immovable and expensive, a main task in energy supply is 
the precise controlling of investments in transmission capacities. Another aspect of 
electric energy is that excess production cannot be stored in large amounts due to 
insufficient and very costly capacities. As a consequence, production and 
consumption of electricity at a certain period of time are directly linked. Finally, 
demand of electric energy fluctuates over time and is difficult to predict. As a 
summary, some inefficiency in electricity markets are inevitable due to the fact that 
energy flow cannot be perfectly observed and storage capacities are strongly 
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limited (Wilson, 2002, pp. 1300). Especially changes of the demand in between a 
short time frame cause highly remarkable costs for providing the additional 
production capacity. 
As one considers the creation of electricity market design, two main tasks have to 
be addressed. First, there is the problem of supporting the entry of sufficient 
investments into network and production capacities and second, there is the 
problem of dealing with market power that leads to incentive incompatibilities in 
energy markets.  
In addition, it is inevitable to consider the fact that power markets generally consist 
of a small number of large producers that supply the demand. Consequently, 
designers of electricity auctions are faced with the problem of bidding reduction in 
order to influence the trading price (ref. Ausubel & Cramton, 2002). Large market 
participants could be tempted to abstain from the trade of the last goods in order to 
manipulate the price according to their individual interests.  
 
Beside the classical requirements that energy supply has to be reliable and cost 
efficient, the need for sustainable production and transportation of electricity is 
getting more important (ref. European Commission, 2012). The issue of changing 
electricity markets towards a sustainable energy supply – one of the crucial 
questions to be answered in the near future – increases the requirement of a 
suitable concept to integrate the development of transport network into the 
process of electricity allocation.  
As one regards the increasing demand for electricity and, in addition, further 
developments in network capacities, conventional concepts that are based on 
central planning or stringent regulation fail to achieve the necessary effectiveness. 
Considering, on the one hand, the financial requirements that are needed in order 
to improve network capacities and, on the other hand, the limited governmental 
budgets, the question arises how to encourage private financiers to invest in 
additional capacities of the transport network. Existing electricity markets are 
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sometimes afflicted by the absence of incentives for private financiers to invest in 
the transport network (Abdala and Chambouleyron, 1999, p.1) due to stringent 
regulation regarding the allocation of network capacities. Consequently, there is a 
discussion whether market-based mechanisms could provide better solutions to 
the problem of energy supply or if stringent regulation is needed in order to 
achieve an affordable, dependable and sustainable electricity market. It is 
expected that market-based power trades lead to a higher output, lower wholesale 
prices and better service quality throughout the energy supply chain. 
On the one hand, perfect competition offers a more comprehensive solution to the 
issue of allocating electric energy than concepts with centrally planned prices. 
Considering Newbery (ref. Newbery, 2003, p. 4), the inefficiency of markets with 
regulatorily defined prices is highly evident. On the other hand, market-based 
concepts are vulnerable to market power, necessitating regulatory elements (ref. 
Meeus, 2010, p. 5).  
 
Considering California’s electricity crises at the beginning of this century when 
electricity costs increased tenfold within a few month, it became traceable that 
deregulation and the presence of market power could lead to enormous imbalance 
in power markets (ref. Borenstein, 2002, p. 191). In 2001 the price development of 
electricity exchanges and the bankruptcy of large consumers forced the state of 
California to intervene into power markets by buying power. Beside market power 
in deregulated markets, observers of the power crises in California suggest that 
the absence of sufficient long-term contracts had advantaged the price 
development (ref. Borenstein, 2002, pp. 201). As mentioned above, the demand of 
electric energy is highly volatile although there exist predictable and dependable 
seasonal components that can be used to partly accommodate the demand by 
using long-term contracts. Consequently, short-term changes of energy demand 
that inevitably lead to inefficiencies could be restrained by short-term contracts as 
day-ahead or intra-day auctions. 
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Nowadays, most industrialized countries have implemented auction designs to 
organize the trade of their power markets adequately according to seasonal 
aspects. Generally, the totality of a power market is separated into a long-term 
auction that manages the basement supply that is constant in the long-run, and 
into day-ahead and intra-day trading that compensate the short-term changes in 
demand39. 
 
Faced with the lack of investment in transmission capacities that limit the options 
for power exchange throughout a coherent market, an interesting approach to deal 
with these insufficiencies of network capacities was developed by Bjørndal and 
Jørnsten. The authors proposed an electricity auction design that is based on the 
division into a finite number of separate energy markets, whereby long-distance 
power trades are reduced to manage on limited network capacities (ref. Bjørndal & 
Jørnsten, 2001). Indeed, the fact that individual information about energy demand 
and supply, in addition to the existing network capacities, are used to define the 
optimal number and size of the several zones induces conflicting interests that 
result in additional incentive incompatibilities in power trades. As a consequence, 
a concept of the Integrated Electricity Market Design proposed subsequently is to 
install a mechanism that finances production and development of network capacity 
by putting together including all relevant participants of energy trades. 
 
Surely, the lack of investments in adequate capacities of generators and 
transmission networks is a negative effect of market power in electricity auctions. 
By deregulating the energy supply, governments put the responsibility of installing 
sufficient capacities for production and transportation of electricity in the hands of 
the market itself. In regulated power markets a central authority manages to 
encourage energy suppliers and network providers to invest in generators and 
networks to meet future demand. Following economic theory (ref. Vázquez & 
                                               
39 Currently, energy exchange companies provide a huge variety of power trade derivatives 
differing in the duration of contract (ref. e.g. the European Energy Exchange, 2013). 
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Rivier & Pérez-Arriaga, 2002, p.1), there are difficulties that prevent free markets 
from providing a sufficient, long-term-secure energy supply. First of all, although 
the investment in additional generators or network capacities is economically 
justified, agents may avoid the risky speculation. Even if the expected income for 
peaking demand is high, risk-averse agents may tend to decline to invest and may 
prefer the secure revenue of short-term demand. Second, market power generally 
creates incentive to influence the price by reducing either demand or offer (ref. 
Ausubel & Cramton, 2002). This problem also prevents oligopolists in power 
markets from investing in generator or network capacities in order to increase the 
price for future trades. 
Vázquez, Rivier and Pérez-Arriaga developed an auction that allocates long-term 
reliability contracts to secure future energy supply. In fact, market participants bid 
on financial call options for long-term power trades with costly penalties for non-
delivery (ref. Vázquez & Rivier & Pérez-Arriaga, 2002, p. 6). However, the 
proposed market for long-term security does not encourage the agents to 
participate without regulatory intervention. 
 
In the short run, the aspect of affordable energy is of priority. Therefore, the short- 
term efficiency is similar to the concept of allocative efficiency, i.e. the 
maximization of the overall gains from trade. By contrast, long-term efficiency is 
defined as the maximization of future gains from energy trades, i.e. it requires to 
minimize the necessary investments and operating costs for the future 
transmission network. Taking into consideration that it is necessary to invest into 
network capacities in order to conserve and partly to enlarge the network, it is 
obvious that in the long run also future efficiency properties have to be regarded 
(ref. De Vries & De Joode & Hakvoort, 2009, p. 3). 
Besides efficiency, the free-riders problem which constitutes a fair share of the 
cost for the network, is essential in electricity market design. As the costs in 
increasing the network capacities are high, the core question is how to ensure a 
reliable refinancing that, in addition, provides a fair share of the effort. Existing 
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concepts propose a refinancing of investments that depends on future trading 
rates. As a consequence, the outcome for the investor is uncertain (ref. Newbery, 
2003, p. 4) and may prevent risk-averse investors to enter the market. Hence, in 
order to remove market entry barriers for potential investors, the investors’ future 
revenues have to be uncoupled from physical transmission of the additional 
routes. 
 
Certainly, it is an important question how to manage the distribution of physical 
and financial transmission rights40. For instance, Chao, Peck, Oren and Wilson 
pointed out that centralized markets generally disregard long-term efficiency while 
focusing on short-term benefits (ref. Chao & Peck & Oren & Wilson, 2000, p. 2). 
On the contrary, competitive markets for transmission rights could facilitate the 
effective and efficient usage of existing network utilities while at the same time 
supporting the adequate development of transmission capacities matching future 
demand. Besides, there is a scientific skepticism about the practicability of 
decentralized markets that manage the allocation of transmission rights. In 
summary, the main arguments against the application of decentralized markets for 
the sale of transmission rights are the expected complexity of such approaches 
and the potential vulnerability to market power. 
However, the authors propose a congestion management that is based on the 
installation of separate markets for the allocation of transmission rights, long-term 
energy trades and short-term energy trades (ref. Chao & Peck & Oren & Wilson, 
2000, p. 22). In a first market, transmission rights are allocated to the market 
participants in annual auctions. Afterwards, there is a secondary market for 
reselling transmission rights according to the actual trend of demand and supply of 
power trades. Considering the energy trades, the authors recommend the 
implementation of known long-term and short-term auction formats. 
                                               
40 Usage rights of network capacity are usually distinguished between physical transmission rights 
– that enable the holder to use a specific transmission interface – and the financial transmission 
rights – that give the holder the right on the congestion rent (ref. Joswok & Tirole, 452). 
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To illustrate, the most important disadvantage of existing energy auction formats is 
that the applied auction formats do not integrate all relevant market participants. 
Moreover, Wilson characterizes an integrated electricity market design as “a long-
term relational contract among participants, and a smart market that includes 
overall optimization of operational decisions” (ref. Wilson, 2002, p.1304). As a 
consequence, in the following chapter an integrated auction design is presented 
that achieves an individually rational, budget balanced and approximately 
incentive compatible electricity transmission.  
In fact, the electricity design is short-term efficient if investments and operating 
costs are neglected, and facilitates a long-term efficient development of the 
transport network. In order to install an aggregate process of financing, production 
and servicing, a mechanism consisting of two one-sided auction series and one 
double auction is installed. Governmental regulation is not required for the price 
definition or the allocation process, but for the establishment of an appropriate 
economic environment, i.e. transparency about the expected capacities of the 
electricity network and future electricity production. 
 
4.2. Setting of an electricity market 
Subsequently, a mechanism is proposed in which four types of agents participate 
in the trade of electric energy. For now, it is assumed that each agent can be 
unambiguously assigned to one of these groups: customers, producers, operators 
or investors41. In this section the mathematical model of the electricity market this 
paper focuses on is defined. 
 
  
                                               
41 The question of whether one agent could act, for instance as a producer and operator at the 
same time without violating the property of incentive compatibility is addressed in section 4.5. 
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(4.4) 
The group of customers is described by 
             
Each of the      buyers requests a finite amount of electric energy  
   
          
in time period          . Obviously the demand of each consumer may vary 
over time. 
Next, 
            
reflects the energy-producing companies, that provide  
   
          
units of electric energy in          . 
 
Remark: It is assumed that demand and offer for the next   time periods are 
known to buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the agents are asked to signal their 
future demand and offer to the auctioneer comparable to existing regulations for 
market transparency (ref. Verordnung (EG) Nr. 714/2009, 2009). 
 
Due to seasonal variation or the improvement of production capacities, the amount 
of energy that is produced by a specific producer is variable. This property is 
considered, as both demand and supply, are functions that depend on time. 
The concept of mechanism design presupposes that each agent has got a 
suggestion to the worth of the good she is going to buy or sell. Of course, this 
suggestion is private knowledge and does not necessarily have to correspond to 
the individual information of her opponents. 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
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(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
Similarily, the individual value assigned to one unit of electric energy by consumer 
           is equal to 
   
      
The individual value for one unit of electric energy given by            is 
furthermore described by 
   
      
 
In contrast to the original design of double auctions in which buyers and sellers 
trade directly, the trade of electric energy requires network capacities to transport 
the electricity from the producers to the customers. This paper distinguishes 
between companies 
            
that invest in the installation of network capacities, and companies  
            
that keep the network in working order. 
 
In each period of time           the auctioneer reconsiders the status of the 
network and finally proposes the investments 
      
    
     
 
that have to be carried out next. The decision of the auctioneer is based on the 
public information about the existing capacities of the producers, the network 
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(4.10) 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
capacities and the prognoses about the future demand42. Eventually, the total 
costs agent            has to afford in           are defined as     
    43  
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality it is assumed that the 
implementation time is constant for each project and equals one time period. For 
this reason, the additional network capacity is completed in the period after the 
investment. 
Similarly to the investments, the auctioneer also divides the totality of maintenance 
tasks into well defined service packages 
      
    
      
 
The total operating expense of company            in           is described 
by    
    . 
Moreover, it is necessary to mathematically express the energy flow as the main 
result of the allocation. The amount of energy seller            delivers to 
buyer            is described by the real value       
     and, eventually, all 
energy trades are summed up in the quantity matrix 
    
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
   
 
In order to adequately map the transmission capacities it is necessary to define 
               
as the set of junction nodes. 
                                               
42 The description of how to select the projects that have to be carried out in the next period of time 
is part of Example 3 and section 4.5. For now, it is assumed that these investment bundles and 
operation service packages are known and well defined. 
43 The definition of the prices for investment and maintenance are part of the proposed mechanism 
(ref. section 4.2 IEMD step 1. And step 2.). 
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(4.13) 
(4.14) 
Consequently, it is possible to introduce    
     to characterizes the amount of 
electric energy that can be transmitted from         to         regarding the 
transmission capacities at          . Finally, these transport capacities are 
combined in the network capacity matrix 
   
 
 
 
 
  
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
  
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
 
 
     
       
 
   
      
        
 
  
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The corresponding cost for transportation are defined as    
     for the 
transmission from         to         regarding the transmission capacities at 
         .44 Similarly, these transport costs are combined in the network 
capacity matrix 
   
 
 
 
 
  
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
  
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
 
 
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
  
      
        
 
   
      
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Remark: To simplify the mathematical model of the electricity market design some 
physical characteristics of power transmissions are neglected. First, it is assumed 
that there is no loss of electric energy due to transmission. 
 
                                               
44 The IEMD is free to use any function   that assigns costs to every branch of the network. As a 
consequence, the auctioneer could use either the actual investments and service fees or could 
choose another approach to quantify the transport costs. 
77 
 
(4.15) 
Second, Kirchhoff’s circuit laws explain basic physical rules for electric engineering 
in transmission networks. The first Kirchhoff law implies that the sum of power 
flows into a junction equals the power flows from the same junction. By using the 
techniques of network flow patterns this characteristic is satisfied by the Integrated 
Electricity Market Design (IEMD). Furthermore, Kirchhoff’s second law indicates 
that the voltage around a closed loop sums up to zero. 
For now, it is assumed that the distribution of electric energy is lossless and that 
Kirchhoff’s second law can be neglected. Feasible enhancements of the IEMD in 
order to ensure both characteristics are discussed in section 4.5.   ■ 
 
After finishing the mathematical description of the economic environment, this 
paper focuses on formulating the assumptions that have to be satisfied in order to 
ensure the expected properties of the auction. As mentioned above, the reliable 
supply of electric energy is an important property for electricity markets. 
Consequently, it is assumed that the producers            , as well as the 
network service providers            , have adequate reserves to 
accommodate the demand in each period of time           .  
Therefore, it is assumed that 
    
 
 
   
     
 
 
   
                 
 
i.e. that the supply exceeds the demand in each period of time45. 
Furthermore, the transport capacities for electric energy have to be sufficient so 
that each consumer has the chance to receive the required amount of electricity. 
Considering that the concept of the proposed auction is to refinance the costs of 
                                               
45 To simplify the mathematical formulation, the reserve constants are fixed in this paper. It is also 
possible to install a net reserve that changes in time according to the uncertainty about the 
prognoses of supply and demand. 
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(4.16) 
(4.17) 
expanding and operating the network, it is obvious that one part of the price per 
unit of electric energy refers to these tasks. Second, it is necessary to consider the 
costs that arise from producing electric energy at the power plants. As mentioned 
above, the idea of this paper is to install a price per unit of electric energy – 
henceforth defined as      – that is the same for each participant in the auction 
and constant for each unit of electric energy that is traded. The concept is to add a 
portion of the costs for developing and controlling the transport network to the 
price for trading one unit of electric energy. 
 
Consequently, the utility of each consumer            can be expressed by  
   
              
      
The utility function of every seller            is given by 
   
                
    
 
In addition, the expenses of the investors and the network operators are 
determined by a one-sided auction design. Therefore, the gains of trades are 
similar to the difference between the individual value of the winner and the second 
lowest bid. 
 
4.3. Concept of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) 
Taking into account the relevant funds that are needed to keep the transmission 
network operational, it is also necessary to pay attention to the process of defining 
responsibilities and compensation for investments in network capacities. 
Consequently, the concept of this mechanism is to guarantee a payback for the 
investors and service providers that equals exactly their initial expense. Therefore, 
the proposed mechanism consists of two steps. In addition, a complete supply of 
consumers is seen as important for a reliable energy supply. Double auctions that 
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exclude sellers from the auction in order to compute the trading price (e.g. the 
double auction from Ausubel (ref. Ausubel, 2004) or the ICDA from chapter 2) are 
not practicable for the allocation in the electricity market design. 
First, the necessary investments in increasing or reducing the transport capacities 
for the next period of time are defined. On the one hand, the necessity of changes 
in network capacity can be determined by analyzing the long-term demand and 
supply sent in by the agents. On the other hand, strategic consideration could 
require the creation of additional transport capacities. For instance, changes in 
energy production towards renewable energy lead to immense transformations in 
the structure of the network. For now, it is assumed that the need of creating 
additional transport capacities is known prior to the start of the auction. 
Second, the operation services are allocated similarly to the process of the 
investments. After building network routes, it is necessary to keep these routes in 
working order. For each stage, one operation service company is defined that is 
responsible to keep the stage in working order. As compensation the responsible 
company gets a certain income that equals the second lowest bid. The trade of 
electric energy itself is addressed by a double auction. In order to include the costs 
for transportation into the allocation phase, methods of the minimum-cost flow 
patterns from Busacker and Gowen (ref. Busacker & Gowen, 1960) are used. In 
each step of the allocation the additional energy trade is defined by searching for 
the nearest producer with free capacity. This is done until the demand of each 
buyer is satisfied. 
In order to generate an allocation process that considers production cost and 
network costs similarly it is necessary to start with the customers as sources of the 
flow problem. Otherwise, production cost would be dominating and the auction 
would not achieve a competitive situation for the transmission capacities. 
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Integrated Electricity Market Design (part 1): 
1. Definition of the investments in the network capacities 
The auctioneer decides which investments in expansion or reduction of 
transport capacities have to be carried out. For the calculation of the 
equivalent of the investment, the auctioneer sets up a one-sided auction 
similar to the well known VCGm.  
For this reason, the investments are grouped, i.e.                defines the 
investment bundles of time period  . For each investment bundle a separate 
one-sided auction is used. As a result, the auctioneer defines the price for 
each bundle             corresponding to the second lowest bid46. 
 
2. Definition of the costs of the operating services 
For each segment of the network the auctioneer sets up a one-sided 
auction in order to define the responsible operators for the next period of 
time, and the corresponding operation fees. 
For this reason, the operation services are grouped, i.e.                
defines the operating service bundles of time period  . For each operating 
service bundle a separate one-sided auction is used. As a result the 
auctioneer defines the price for each bundle             corresponding to 
the second lowest bid. 
Consequently, the financier of       is the agent      with the lowest 
offer. 
 
 
                                               
46 In case there is no unique minimum bid the auctioneer chooses the financier randomly. 
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Remark: As mentioned above, the auction of the investment bundles and the 
operation service packages is constructed by using several one-sided auctions. As 
these auctions are based on the well known VCGm the Integrated Electricity 
Market Design (part 1) is individually rational, allocative efficient and incentive 
compatible.   ■  
 
Integrated Electricity Market Design (part 2): 
3. Allocation of electricity: 
a. All buyers and sellers are asked to send in their demand and their 
individual value referring to that demand. Without loss of generality, it 
can be assumed that the customers are sorted according to their 
private values, i.e. 
   
     
       
   
b. Compute the matrix    
         
   
        
  for which      reflects the 
shortest distance from each buyer    to every seller    including the 
marginal price    
 . 
Initialize the matrix    
         
   
        
     for which      
reflects the current maximum network flow from each buyer    to 
every seller   . 
The quantity matrix is initialized, i.e.     
   
   
   
 . 
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c. For     to   
While         
     
  
    and               
        
     
    . 
       
        
         
         
  
       
         
      
 
    . 
        . 
  If    
         
  
    the 
   For     to  
          . 
   Next 
  End if 
    is updated according to the added power flow. 
 End While 
Next 
d. The price is defined by 
      
                  
     
        
    
        
 
  
. 47 
e. If    
     
              remove    from the auction (       and 
return to a. 
                                               
47 The price function of step d. could be replaced by any function             according to the 
preferences of the auctioneer. 
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Example 3:  
In the following, an example of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) is 
presented that consists of four consumers and two producers of electric energy.  
 
The following picture illustrates the structure of the energy network. 
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The network costs are described by the matrix 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and the corresponding network capacities are described by 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
       
        
        
        
        
        
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
It is assumed that the cost for the investments and that for the operation services 
have already been fixed:      
       and      
     . 
The buyers are sorted according to their individual values, 
i.e.    
     
     
     
 . 
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Results of the IEMD: 
  :  The shortest distance to a producer is    to    with a maximum capacity of 
10 and a total cost of 9. 
 Consequently, buyer    purchases 10 units from seller    using the route 
           . 
  :  The shortest distance to a producer is    to    with a maximum capacity of 
10 and a total cost of 10. 
 Consequently, buyer    purchases 2 units from seller    using the route 
           . 
  :  The shortest distance to a producer is    to    with a maximum capacity of 3 
(due to the limits of      ) and a total cost of 10. 
 Consequently, buyer    purchases 3 units from seller    using the route 
           . 
As buyer    demands 5 units, the mechanism skips to the next seller. 
The shortest distance to a producer is    is to    with a maximum capacity 
of 2 and a total cost of 14. 
 Consequently, buyer    purchases 2 units from seller    using the route 
           . 
  :  The shortest distance to a producer is    to    with a maximum capacity of 0 
and a total cost of 14. 
 Consequently, buyer    purchases 0 units from seller    using the route 
As buyer    demands 6 units, the mechanism skips to the next seller. 
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The shortest distance to a producer is    to    with a maximum capacity of 8 
and a total cost of 15. 
 Consequently, buyer    purchases 8 units from seller    using the route 
           . 
The trading price is set to       
  
     
        
    
        
 
  
   
  
  
    . 
 
Besides the allocation the auctioneer gets as a result of the IEMD the current limits 
of the transmission network. When examining the next producer from    it turns 
out, that the network capacity       is nearly used at this period of time. As a 
consequence,    has to pay a higher price for the last 5 units to be traded. 
 
The following picture illustrates the structure of the energy network with an 
adapted transmission network (ref.       
  and       
 ). 
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In order to use the remaining production capacities of    sufficiently the auctioneer 
could either invest in additional capacity of route       or build the route      . 
Supposing that valid data about future demand and offer is available the problem 
of finding the favorable investment or non-investing is well defined. 
Actually, the additional link between    and    leads to an increased gain from 
trade of 15 cost units.   ■ 
 
As mentioned above it is essential to separate the totality of power trades into 
several markets that are distinguished in the durance of their contracts. 
Considering the inefficiencies of power trades that occur from short-term changes 
the separation into intra-day, day-ahead and long-term auctions is important. 
Consequently, it is convenient to implement several instances of the IEMD for 
intra-day, day-ahead and long-term power markets. 
 
Another aspect that supports the idea of implementing several IEMD with varying 
contract durations is the fact, that additional information is necessary to determine 
needs for improving the transmission network. Based on long-term information and 
the network deficit analyses of the current trades the auctioneer is able to identify 
the next steps of network modifications. In addition, non-economic consideration, 
such as sustainability and urban development, could be regarded to define the 
investment bundles                at the beginning of the auction. 
The economic demand for further transmission capacities could be based on the 
potential costs for investing in comparison to the expected surplus of future trades. 
Several instances of the IEMD could compute allocation scenarios based on the 
data about future demand, offer and marginal prices that each agent reveals to the 
auctioneer. 
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4.4. Characteristics of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) 
Finally, this section analyzes which properties the IEMD satisfies and which 
assumptions have to be made. Furthermore, the consequences of the 
assumptions for an implementation in real life are discussed. 
As mentioned above, the main properties of mechanism design are individual 
rationality, budget balance, incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency. 
According to the studies of Myerson and Satterthwaite (ref. Myerson & 
Satterthwaite, 1983), it is impossible to create a double auction that 
simultaneously satisfies these four properties. As a consequence, at least one of 
them has to be relaxed in order to satisfy the others. The IEMD ensures the 
properties budget balance and individual rationality, but allocative efficiency and 
incentive compatibility are not completely satisfied.  
 
Proposition 4.1: The IEMD is budget balanced and individually rational. 
 
Proof: First, budget balance is achieved as the payments of the consumers equal 
exactly the sum received by the producers. In addition, the investments and the 
operation service fees of time period   are completely balanced by the surcharge 
           . 
Second, each agent has got a non-negative outcome due to the structure of the 
auction. This property is ensured as only trades are considered for which the 
condition                     is satisfied. 
Consequently, the IEMD is budget balanced and individually rational.   □ 
 
Regarding step 3.d. of the IEMD, the trading price is defined by using the 
individual value of one seller. In fact, the trading price is set according to the value 
of the producer that has been considered during the last trade of the auction. As a 
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consequence, there exists an incentive for at least this agent to misrepresent her 
own value in order to increase the price. Due to this fact, the mechanism is not 
incentive compatible, although the chance of finding a bidding strategy that 
generates a higher outcome compared to acting honestly vanishes if the number 
of agents increases (ref. Satterthwaite & Williams, 1989). In addition, the 
maximum benefit of cheating is limited from above by the next potential supplier – 
the first one not considered during the auction. 
 
Proposition 4.2: If network capacities are sufficient and the energy reserve 
satisfies the condition                with      , the IEMD is short-term 
efficient, i.e. the mechanism maximizes the gain from trade. 
 
Proof: Supposed that there exists an allocation   that creates a higher total gain 
from trade than the proposed solution   , the sum of the buyers’ gains from trade 
or the sum of the sellers’ gains from trade have to exceed that of the proposed 
mechanism, 
i.e. 
    
      
 
   
    
    
 
   
 
or  
    
      
 
   
    
     
 
   
 
 
First, the sellers are sorted in descending order according to their bids. Second, 
the energy trade is allocated by assigning the minimum cost flow, including the 
cost for production. For this reason, if network capacity is not a limiting factor the 
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allocation found by the proposed mechanism minimizes the production costs. 
Furthermore, the assumption                with       guarantees that there 
is a competition for the last power trade. As a consequence, the gain from 
misrepresenting the true values is limited and do not change the total gains from 
trade, i.e. the mechanism is allocative efficient.   □ 
 
Remark: If the information about future values and future demand and supply are 
reliable, then the IEMD facilitates an efficient development of the transport 
network. Considering the assumption of proposition 4.2 about sufficient network 
capacities, the auction of IEMD can give an indication where to expand or reduce 
the capacities of the network and the electricity production. If a trade cannot be 
carried out because of missing transport capacities, the principal gets an indication 
where to enlarge the network. As a result, it is possible to achieve long-term 
efficiency if the signals about future demand and supply are reliable. 
Consequently, the main task for a central regulation is to ensure the quality of the 
agents’ prognoses.   ■ 
 
Proposition 4.3: Considering service providers and investors, the IEMD is 
incentive compatible without further assumptions. If it can be assumed that the 
network capacities are sufficient, the buyers have no inventive to misrepresent 
their true values. Considering the producers, the gain from misrepresenting the 
true values is limited if there exists an upper bound              for the 
producers’ values. 
 
Proof: The allocation of single investment bundle or a single operation service 
bundle is executed in a separate first-price auction before the electricity allocation 
process. The concept of the IEMD is that each investment of                and 
each operation service package of                is refinanced by the sale of 
electricity. As a successful auction of the IEMD refinances exactly the sum the 
91 
 
investors and operators spent in step 1. and step 2., the IEMD is incentive 
compatible regarding the service providers and investors. 
In addition, the buyers have no incentive to misrepresent their true values as the 
individual information of the buyers are only used in step 3.a. of the IEMD (to sort 
the buyers according to their values) and in step 3.c. (to decide whether to execute 
a certain trade or not). Taking into account that the trading price       
  
            is calculated without using the individual information of the buyers, it is 
clear that the buyers have no incentive to signal false information in order to 
influence the trading price. Supposing that the network capacities are sufficient, all 
buyers receive the demanded amount of electric energy due to assumption (4.15). 
As a consequence, the IEMD is incentive compatible for the buyers if the network 
capacities are sufficient. 
Considering the last trade, the involved seller    
  has an influence on the trading 
price       
             . Furthermore, each producer could gain from signaling 
false values as the individual values of the producers are considered by the 
minimum cost flow of step 3 of the IEMD. The gain from signal false values is 
limited by the individual value of the next producers with free capacity. 
Consequently, the gain from misrepresenting the true values is limited.   □ 
 
4.5. Discussion of the properties of the Integrated Electricity Market 
Design (IEMD) 
In short, the main idea of the IEMD is to bring together all relevant participants of 
an energy supply chain. As a consequence, it is necessary to discuss whether it is 
essential to distinguish stringently between the different types of participants, or if 
it is possible that one company could act in different roles of energy supply. For 
instance, it is necessary to investigate if a producing company could also invest in 
additional network capacities that are directly linked to their own power plants. For 
this reason, the most important aspect is to clarify if incentives arise to act 
dishonestly. In fact, some regulation is necessary to predict the main incentive 
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incompatibilities that arise if energy-producing companies also invest in 
transmission capacities. 
Taking into account that in step 3.b. of the IEMD the costs for transportation and 
production are used for allocation, it is obvious that producers may have incentives 
to consciously signal lower investment costs in order to facilitate the building of 
additional network capacities that connects their plant. This means producers may 
have an incentive to underrate the costs for connecting their power plants to gain 
from a more competitive network in future auctions. As a summary, if a producer 
cannot sell her complete production due to a limitation of network capacities, she 
may be interested in misrepresenting the true value for an investment in order to 
sell more electricity in the following auctions. Consequently, the central authority 
has to avoid these incentive incompatibilities by forbidding producers to invest in 
network capacities that are closely linked to their own power plants. 
 
In contrast, a close collaboration between an energy producing company and an 
operation service provider does not induce comparable incentives to act 
dishonestly. The main difference between an investment in additional network 
capacities and the operation service of an existing network is that an investment is 
carried out once, whereas the operation service has to be maintained as long as 
the network is in order. Due to the fact that operation service packages are 
announced more often than investments, the incentive incompatibilities that arise 
from collaboration between a producer and a service provider are comparatively 
small. Additionally, keeping the transmission network in working order does not 
increase its capacity. Consequently, service providing has no influence on the 
allocation process of the IEMD. 
 
Finally, it has to be investigated if adverse effects for the incentive compatibility 
are expected if buyers also act as investors, producers or service providers. 
Considering the formulation of the IEMD, the buyers are sorted in a descending 
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order according to their individual values. In addition, the trading price per unit of 
electric energy is constant in each period of time. Obviously, buyers cannot 
increase their gains from trade by acting dishonest, if their demand for electricity is 
completely supplied. 
 
Finally, the relaxations made in section 4.2 concerning the lossless distribution of 
electric energy and Kirchhoff’s second have to be considered. Obviously, the 
IEMD can be extended to represent the distribution losses by changing the 
definition of the transmission cost matrix         . Additionally, the extra 
production to balance the losses of the transmission has to be regarded in the 
allocation phase of step 3.c. 
In order to integrated the requirements of Kirchhoff’s second law it is essential to 
adapt the method for computing the maximum flow in step 3.b. Instead of 
determining a single route from a buyer to a seller it is necessary to pay attention 
to a consistent flow in parallel routes and circles. 
 
In recent years, the scientific discourse about energy supply demands for an 
integrated concept to combine a long-term efficient, reliable and sustainable 
electricity market design that also assists the development of the transmission 
network. Therefore, the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) enlarges the 
existing models by proposing a market-based concept that is budget balanced, 
individual rational and which facilitates short-term and long-term efficiency. 
Furthermore, the IEMD provides a concept for a low-risk investment in network 
capacities that advances the market entrance for new financiers. In addition, the 
incentives to misrepresent the true values are limited and only existent for the 
producers of electric energy. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focuse on 
three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from 
mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to 
balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics 
a mechanism should provide. 
Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of 
allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as 
double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market 
designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and 
disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive 
compatibility. 
 
For instance, the direction of the flow optimization of the Integrated Electricity 
Market Design (IEMD) enables the participation of all potential buyers. Therefore, 
agents whose private information is needed to compute the trading price and to 
allocate the electric energy remain in the allocation process of the IEMD. Although 
this creates incentives to misrepresent the true values it is seen as more important 
that energy supply must be dependable. Costs for a lack of energy supply due to 
the definition of the auction design may be significant for a single agent. In 
contrast, the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) accepts that a selection 
of buyers and sellers are removed from the allocation process in order to prevent 
incentive incompatibilities. Consequently, the concrete consideration whether to 
relax allocative efficiency or incentive compatibility depends on the specific 
application of the auction design. 
 
As a summary, the dissertation concentrates on three complex economic 
environments and enlarges existing auction concepts. Thereby, a double auction 
is presented that achieves budget balance, individual rationality and incentive 
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compatibility for private-valuation environments without further assumption 
concerning the individual values. Furthermore, the proposed double auction is 
asymptotically allocative efficient for single-unit markets and multi-unit markets 
with homogeneous goods, if the number of participants grows. For multi-unit 
market with heterogeneous goods the achievement of asymptotical allocative 
efficiency depends on the homogeneity of the buyer-seller-structure. 
 
Another important aspect this dissertation addresses is Wilson’s demand for 
mechanisms that request less individual information for allocation processes. So, 
the presented dynamic auction for interdependent-valuation environments 
enlarges the existing concepts as it requires less individual information from the 
agents as existing static auction formats. Additionally, the Alternating-Price 
Auction (APA) broadens the scope of application for dynamic auctions as it relaxes 
the activity rule of Ausubel’s Ascending-Bid Auction. 
 
Finally, the concept for power markets described in chapter 4 offers the type of an 
“integrated market design” Wilson asked for (ref. Wilson, 2002, p.1304). The 
Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) facilitates short-term and long-term 
efficiency while at the same time provides a concept for enabling low-risk capital 
expenditures in transmission capacities. Thereby, the IEMD introduces a setting 
that involves several relevant stakeholders as energy-producing companies, 
investors, service providers and consumers. Obviously, the balancing of the 
conflicting interests of these stakeholders is the main task for designing adequate 
electricity markets. As a summary, the IEMD provides a markets concept that 
facilitates short-term and long-term efficiency properties while at the same time it 
offers an innovative idea of removing market entry barriers for new investments in 
transmission network capacities. 
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